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EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT, EFFECT ON
CONSUMERS, AND THE FLAWED
PROFIT-SACRIFICE STANDARD
STEVEN

C.

SALOP*

I. INTRODUCTION

Antitrust law sets standards for the competitive behavior of firms.
There are two broad classes of anticompetitive conduct: collusion and
exclusion. Collusion involves a group of firms cooperating with one
another to restrict their own output. Exclusion involves a firm (or group
of firms) raising the costs or reducing the revenues of competitors in
order to induce the competitors to raise their prices, reduce output, or
exit from the market. Utilizing either collusive or exclusionary practices,
the firm (or group of firms) can achieve or maintain market power.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act focuses on exclusionary conduct, i.e.,
conduct that creates or maintains monopoly power by disadvantaging
and harming competitors.!
Exclusionary conduct decisions by antitrust enforcers and the courts
sometimes have been criticized for protecting inefficient competitors

* Professor of Economics and Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to
thank Todd Anderson, jonathan Baker, Richard Brunell, Timothy Brennan, Margaret
Bloom, Stephen Calkins, Dennis Carlton, Aaron Edlin, Einer Elhauge, joseph Farrell,
john Fingleton, Warren Grimes, George Hay, Ken Heyer, Herbert Hovenkamp,jonathan
jacobson, Thomas Krattenmaker, David McGowan, Alan Meese, john Nannes, Rainer
Nitsche,janusz Ordover, Mark Popofsky, Carl Shapiro,joe Sims,john Vickers, Greg Vistnes,
Gregory Werden, Robert Willig,john Woodbury, and the Editors for comments and helpful
conversations on these issues. lowe special thanks to Andrew Gavil and A Douglas
Melamed, who have both motivated and educated me about the complexity of these issues,
and to Serge Moresi for helping me understand the more subtle economic issues. An
earlier version of this article was presented at the AALS meeting in San Francisco, in
january 2005.
1 Section 1 of the Sherman Act is implicated when a group of competitors engages in
collective exclusion, as in the case of exclusionary group boycotts, such as Tuys 'R' Us or
pC Petroleum. Toys 'R' Us v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000); jTC Petroleum Co. v.
Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1999). In addition, Section 2 is implicated
when a single firm attempts to orchestrate a cartel, as in American Airlines. United States
v. American Airlines, 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984). Section 2 is also implicated for mergers
to monopoly and conspiracies to monopolize.
311
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at the expense of consumers.2 Competitors may be disadvantaged and
harmed by exclusionary conduct that raises their costs or cuts off their
access to customers or suppliers. However, sometimes conduct that harms
competitors benefits consumers, implying that such conduct should be
applauded as competition on the merits, not attacked. Antitrust law is
said to be a "consumer welfare prescription."3 The potential tension
between harm to competitors and harm to consumers has created longstanding controversy regarding the proper legal standards to govern
exclusionary conduct. 4 Even where harmful conduct is identified, critics
suggest that enforcement will end up deterring other conduct that is
beneficial to consumers.5
There is currently great intellectual ferment over the proper antitrust
liability standard governing allegedly exclusionary conduct under Section 2 in the United States and Article 82 in Europe. This article focuses
on the two main competing liability standards: the profit-sacrifice standard
(and the no economic sense variant of the test) and the consumer welfare
effect standard. The profit-sacrifice standard was introduced into antitrust
not as a complete test for exclusionary conduct, but as a test of anticompetitive intent or as part of a multi-pronged standard. 6 It recently has
been suggested that the profit-sacrifice test alternatively could be made
the only permissible evidence of anticompetitive purpose or even could
be declared the sole liability standard. 7 For example, the government's
amicus brief at the petition stage in Trinko seemed to take this position
as a way to reduce false positives. s Judge Ginsburg's Covad opinion also
See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 64-66 (1978).
3 See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,432 (2d Cir. 1945).
5 See Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal
Standards and Microsoft, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. I, 31 (1999); Frank Easterbrook, Predatory .
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 266 (1981) [hereinafter Predatory
Strategies] .
6 Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and
Product Innovation, 91 YALE LJ. 8 (1981) [hereinafter Predation].
2

7 The profit-sacrifice test is often characterized as a "predation" test for non-price
predatory conduct For example, in Covad, Judge Ginsburg stated that, "in the vernacular
of antitrust law, a 'predatory' practice is one in which a firm sacrifices short-term profits
in order to drive out of the market or otherwise discipline a competitor." Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Although the focus of
the analysis in this article is exclusionary conduct other than predatory pricing, the Brooke
Group standard, set out by the Supreme Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & WiUiamson
Tobacco Cup., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), is relevant to the analysis because of its conceptual
relationship to the profit-sacrifice test. However, this article is not focused on evaluating
the usefulness of the Brooke Group standard for predatory pricing cases.
B See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 15, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
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seems to take this position. 9 Gregory Werden 10 and A. Douglas Melamed ll
have suggested a variation on this standard that Werden refers to as the
"no economic sense" standard. In contrast, the D.C. Circuit's Microsoft
opinion,12 the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise,13 and my own work l4 suggest
that consumer welfare effect would be a better overarching standard.
Mark Popofskyl5 has suggested that there should not be a single standard,
but instead the standard should differ according to the category of
conduct alleged. 16
The central thesis of this article is that the use of the profit-sacrifice
test as the sole liability standard for exclusionary conduct, or as a required
prong of a multi-pronged liability standard is fundamentally flawed. The
profit-sacrifice test may be useful, for example, as one type of evidence
of anticompetitive purpose. In unilateral refusal to deal cases, it can be
useful in determining the non-exclusionary benchmark. However, the
test is not generally a reliable indicator of the impact of allegedly exclusionary conduct on consumer welfare-the primary focus of the antitrust
laws. The profit-sacrifice test also is prone to several significant pitfalls
and often would be complex and subjective to implement in practice.
As a result, relying on the profit-sacrifice test as the legal standard would
lead to significant legal errors.
Instead, a better standard to govern exclusionary conduct is the consumer welfare effect test, which is focused directly on the anticompetitive
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (No. 02-682) [hereinafter Brief for the United States];
see also R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of
Justice, The Common Law Approach and Improving Standards for Analyzing Single Firm
Conduct, Address at the Thirtieth Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and
Policy (Oct. 23, 2003), available at hup://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/202724.
htm.
9 Covad Communications, 398 F.3d at 676.
10 Cregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The "No Economic
Sense" Test, infra this issue, 73 ANTITRUST LJ. 413 (2006).
11 A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice
and Refusals to Deal, 20 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1247 (2005) [hereinafter Exclusionary Conduct];
A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Conduct-Are There
Unifying Principles? infra this issue, 73 ANTITRUST LJ. 375 (2006) [hereinafter Unifying
Principles].
12 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
13
3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw ~ 651d, at 79 (2d
ed.2002).
14 Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal
Standards, and Microsoft, 7 CEO. MASON L. REv. 617, 64~7 (1999).
15 Mark S. Poposky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule of Reason, and the
Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, infra this issue, 73 ANTITRUST LJ. 435 (2006)
[hereinafter Antitrust Rules]. See also Mark S. Popofsky, Charting Antitrust's New Frontier, 9
CEO. MASON L. REv. 565, 578 (2001) [hereinafter New Frontier].
16 The equally-efficient entrant standard is also discussed briefly in this article.
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effect of exclusionary conduct on price and consumer welfare. This
standard can be described in various ways: for example, as conduct that
is "unreasonably exclusionary" or "unnecessarily restrictive," or simply
as conduct that causes "consumer harm." Although this standard has
been criticized, it can be implemented without causing excessive false
positives that might lead to over-deterrence or a welfare-reducing diminution in innovation incentivesP Many of the criticisms of the consumer
welfare standard are based on a misunderstanding of the workings of
the standard relative to the profit-sacrifice test. In fact, the consumer
welfare standard exhibits fewer potential over-deterrence and underdeterrence errors in implementation. For example, the profit-sacrifice
standard may well be more likely to condemn a cost-reducing investment
that leads to market power than would the consumer welfare effect
standard.
II. COMPETING LEGAL STANDARDS
While there are a number of alternative legal standards that could be
used to govern allegedly exclusionary conduct under Section 2, the main
focus of this article is on the profit-sacrifice standard and the consumer
welfare effect standard. Comparison of the relative efficacy of these
two standards involves the issue of optimal legal decision making with
imperfect information, and the tension between over-deterrence (false
positives) and under-deterrence (false negatives) .18
A. THE BROOKE GROUP PREDATORY PRICING STANDARD,
EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT, AND RAISING RIVALS' COSTS

The paradigmatic predatory pricing theory involves reducing price
with the purpose and effect of causing rivals to exit from the market,
generally by winning a war of attrition, and thereby allowing the predator
to profit by raising price to the monopoly level. I9 In Brooke Group, the
Supreme Court set out a two-part liability standard for predatory pricing
that involves (1) evaluating whether the conduct involves below-cost
pricing and (2) evaluating the likelihood of recoupment. 20 The Brooke
17 For example, when the market impact of exclusionary conduct involves an uncertain
impact, a consumer welfare standard would evaluate the conduct on an ex ante (i.e.,
expectations) basis rather than an ex post (observed outcome) basis.
18 The term "false positives" refers to erroneous convictions and the term "false negatives"
refers to erroneous acquittals.
19 The theory of predatory pricing underpinning the Brooke Group standard and the
standard itself have been criticized by post-Chicago economists. See infra note 24. However,
summarizing and developing those criticisms is beyond the scope of this article.
20 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24
(1993).
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Group standard, in principle, could be applied to all exclusionary conduct. A court could first evaluate whether the defendant's price exceeds
its cost. If it does, then the conduct would not be condemned. 21 If the
price falls short of the cost, then the court would evaluate whether the
defendant likely would be able to recoup its losses by exercising durable
market power in the future.

Obviously, this approach would constitute a very permissive standard
with respect to non-predatory pricing exclusionary conduct. For example,
payments to input suppliers to induce them to refuse to deal with rivals
would be allowed unless the payments were so large that the defendant's
overall profits turned negative. Similarly, burning down a rival's factory
would not violate the antitrust laws as long as the arsonist's fee was
modest and the predator charged a high output price, so that its price
remained above its costs. Conduct that was used to maintain an existing
monopoly would be treated more permissively because the defendant's
initial price would be at the highly profitable monopoly level.
Predatory pricing is one paradigmatic type of exclusionary conduct.
Raising rivals' costs (RRC) is another paradigm. 22 RRC generally describes
conduct to raise the costs of competitors with the purpose and effect of
causing them to raise their prices or reduce their output, thereby allowing
the excluding firm to profit by setting a supracompetitive price. 23 Analysis
consistent with the RRC paradigm is commonly applied to exclusivity
arrangements that have the effect of raising rivals' distribution costs.
RRC conduct is more likely to harm consumers than is predatory
pricing for several reasons. First, unlike predatory pricing, or at least the
21 This raises the issue of the definition of "below-cost," an issue that the Supreme Court
explicitly did not decide in Brooke Group. Edlin and Farrell have pointed out that the test
could mean simply non-profit-maximizing pricing or it might mean actually losing money
on average. See Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph Farrell, The American Airlines Case: A Chance to
Clarify Predation Policy, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND
POLICY 502, 510-17 (John E. Kwoka,Jr. & Lawrence]. White eds., 4th ed. 2004).
22 Steven Salop & David SchefIman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 267 (May
1983); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals'
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209 (1986). The term "RRC" is preferable to
the term "non-price predation," for several reasons. First, the conduct often does involve
prices, in particular, input prices. Second, the term "predation" has become associated
with causing victims to exit from the market, and RRC strategies often involve merely
disadvantaging competitors without causing them to exit from the market. Third, courts
might mechanically interpret the word "predation" as legally implying the appropriateness
of the current legal tests for predatory pricing. See Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl.
Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying a profit-sacrifice test in an RRC
context); supra note 7.
23 See generally Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 22. Output reductions may occur in
the short run and the long run, and could involve output reductions flowing from
reduced innovation.

HeinOnline -- 73 Antitrust L.J. 315 2005-2006

316

ANTITRUST

LAw JOURNAL

[Vol. 73

paradigmatic view of predatory pricing, successful RRC does not require
a risky investment or associated profit sacrifice during an initial predatory
period that may only be recouped at some later point in the future. 24
Instead, recoupment often occurs simultaneously with the RRC conduct.
Thus, it is more likely to succeed, which also means that it is more likely
to be attempted.
Second, unlike predatory pricing, successful RRC does not require the
exit of rivals or even the permanent reduction in competitors' production
capacity. If the marginal costs of established competitors are raised, those
rivals will have the incentive to raise their prices and reduce their output,
even if they remain viable. This also means that RRC is more likely to
succeed and, therefore, is more likely to be attempted.
Third, unlike paradigmatic predatory pricing intended to permit a
deep pocket defendant to win a war of attrition, RRC is not necessarily
more costly in the short run to the defendant than to its victims. For
example, a threat may not be very costly to the perpetrator but could
substantially raise the target firm's costs. 25 A lower cost of excluding
means that the conduct is more likely to succeed and, therefore, more
likely to be attempted.
Fourth, unlike predatory pricing, successful RRC does not always
involve a short-term consumer benefit that mayor may not be overwhelmed by longer-term consumer harm during the recoupment
period. 26 In RRC, rivals whose variable costs increase would have the
incentive immediately to raise their prices or reduce their output. As a
result, the consumer harm would occur immediately. Thus, there is more
likely to be consumer harm from RRC than from predatory pricing.
24 See generally Salop & Scheffman, sUfrra note 22; see also Krattenmaker & Salop, sufrra
note 22, at 224. Economists have formulated additional-and sometimes more complextheories of predatory pricing that have market impacts closer to RRC conduct. See, e.g.,
Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST LJ. 585, 590 (1994) [hereinafter Predatory Pricing]; Patrick Bolton et aI., Predatory
Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. LJ. 2239, 2241 (2000); Aaron Edlin, Stopping
Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE LJ. 941 (2002). However, this article generally will
focus on the conventional predatory pricing theory and how that paradigm differs from
the RRC paradigm.
25 Pushing up the market price of an input by increased purchasing could raise the
marginal costS of an unintegrated rival by more than it would raise the cost of the integrated
firm that carries out the overbuying. Oliver E. Williamson, Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry:
The Pennington Case in Perspective, 82 QJ. EcoN. 85 (1968); see also Steven C. Salop,
Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST LJ. 669 (2005) [hereinafter Anticompetitive Overbuying]; Susan A. Creighton et aI., Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST LJ. 975
(2005).
26 The immediate consumer benefit from the low "predatory" prices mayor may not be
trumped by higher prices during a subsequent recoupment period. Concern with this
tradeoff is endemic to all discussions of predatory pricing.
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Fifth, unlike predatory pricing, RRC has an analogue to naked price
fixing, what might be called "naked RRC," that is, exclusionary conduct
where there are no valid efficiency benefits for the exclusion, for example, when the defendant's claims are pretextual, noncognizable, or the
benefits are insignificant. 27 Such failed claims arise in Lorain Joumal,28
fTC Petroieum,29 Conwood,30 and Dentsply.31 At the same time, however,
consumer harm is not inevitable, even for naked RRC conduct. This is
because there may be sufficient competition to prevent the defendant
from raising prices in the output market. For example, if a firm burns
down the factory of one out of many equally efficient competitors that
lack expansion barriers, then the other competitors could increase their
output and, thereby, maintain competitive prices. 32
27 In fact, what might be called "stark naked" RRC involves the extreme case of conduct
when a firm approaches input suppliers that supply only its rivals (but not itself) and pays
them to deny critical inputs to these rivals. Salop, Anticompetitive Overbuying, supra note
25, at 684 n.37. Pre textual claims involve rationales invented by the defendant or its lawyers
for litigation purposes. As stated in the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, cognizable
efficiencies are "efficiencies that have been verified by the Agencies, that do not arise
from anticompetitive reductions in output or service, and that cannot be achieved through
practical, significantly less restrictive means. Non-cognizable claims include conduct that
amounts to a reduction in competition or that is not reasonably necessary to achieve the
benefit or where there is no supporting evidence for the applicability of the rationale to
the specific facts of the case." Federal Trade Comm 'n & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust
Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors § 3.36 (2000), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf [hereinafter Competitor Collaboration
Guidelines]. For example, in the context of Section I, the NCAA joint venture engaged
in a variety of beneficial practices for college football. However, the Court concluded that
its role in setting the price for 1V broadcasts lacked any valid benefits and led to higher
prices and fewer games being telecast. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113-19 (1984).
28 Lorain Journal suggests no procompetitive rationale for the newspaper's decision to
offer only all-or-nothing exclusive contracts to advertisers. Lorain Journal Co. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (adoption of exclusive advertising policy that deprived competing radio station of advertising revenue).
29 Judge Richard Posner suggests that the sole purpose of denying asphalt to lTC was
to prevent it from acting like a maverick competitor and disrupting an alleged price-fixing
cartel of the other applicators who also bought asphalt from the suppliers. JTC Petroleum
Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 778-79 (7th Cir. 1999).
!O In Conwood, there was no convincing efficiency justification for the defendant tobacco
company destroying the display racks used by retailers for its competitors' products.
Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002)
SI In the Dentsply case, the exclusive arrangements, in principle, could have prevented
free riding but the court concluded that the procompetitive justifications for the exclusivity
were pretextual. United States v. Dentsply Int'l Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2005).
S2 This raises the question of the appropriate legal standard for such naked exclusionary
conduct. See generally Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 22. For example, in a speech given
while he was at Antitrust Division, A. Douglas Melamed suggested that competitive harm
might be inferred if there were no plausible procompetitive efficiency benefits, even if
there is no proof of an impact on prices paid by consumers. A. Douglas Melamed, Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Exclusionary
Vertical Agreements, Remarks Before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, available at http://
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Not all RRC conduct is naked, of course. Some exclusionary conduct
leads to cost savings, product improvements, or elimination of free riding.
The existence of such benefits to the excluding firm does not necessarily
mean that consumers gain an overall "net" benefit from the conduct.
Evaluating the net impact on consumers would require comparing the
magnitudes of the opposing forces leading to higher versus lower prices
to see which is likely to be stronger.
Because predatory pricing and RRC are so different, there is no reason
to think that they should be governed by the same standards for antitrust
liability. In fact, the Brooke Group standard is not generally proposed as
the liability standard for exclusionary conduct other than predatory
pricing. Instead, two other legal standards generally are discussed, the
profit-sacrifice standard and the consumer welfare effect standard. The
profit-sacrifice standard is closer to and grows out of the predatory pricing
paradigm and the Brooke Group standard (though there are significant
differences discussed below).
The fact that RRC conduct generally raises more significant competitive risks than predatory pricing suggests that a more restrictive legal
standard is appropriate. RRC conduct can be evaluated effectively with
a consumer welfare effect standard that evaluates whether the conduct
harms competitors by raising their costs and whether those higher costs
harm consumers and competition by allowing the defendant to achieve,
maintain, or enhance monopoly power. 33 In carrying out this analysis, the
procompetitive rationales for the conduct would be taken into account in
evaluating the overall competitive impact of the conduct on consumers.
B.

THE PROFIT-SACRIFICE STANDARD 34

The profit-sacrifice standard is an intellectual descendant of the belowcost prong of the Brooke Group predatory pricing standard, generalized
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1623.httn. See also Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 CEO. MASON L. REv. 485 (1999)
[hereinafter Promoting Innovation]; Creighton et aI., supra note 25.
55 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("although
Microsoft did not bar its rivals from all means of distribution, it did bar them from the
cost-efficient ones"); Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 189,191-96. In Aspen Skiing, the Court also was
concerned about increases in the plaintiff's distribution costs. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608 (1985).
!14 For a variety of other analyses of the profit-sacrifice test for exclusionary conduct, see
Edlin & Farrell, supra note 21; Janusz A Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Access and Bundling
in High-Technology Markets, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOIT MONOPOLY:
ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 103-28 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M.
Lenard eds., 1999) [hereinafter Access and Bundling] ; Einer Elhauge, Defining Betler Monapoliz.ation Standards, 56 STANFORD L. REv. 253 (2003); Andrew I. Cavil, Dominant Firm Distribution: Striking a Betler Balance, 72 ANTITRUST LJ. 3 (2004) [hereinafter Dominant Firm
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for more complex non-price exclusion scenarios. 35 The profit-sacrifice
test examines the profitability of the defendant's conduct relative to
a hypothetical market outcome that is used as the non-exclusionary
benchmark. The hypothetical "but-for" marketplace is one in which it
is impossible to raise prices following the exclusionary conduct. When
exclusionary conduct potentially raises barriers to competition in some
way, a defendant's exclusionary conduct can be said to sacrifice profits
if the conduct would have been unprofitable (and, thus, likely not undertaken) in the absence of those enhanced barriers to competition. This
basic idea can be formulated in various ways.36
Recently, Gregory Werden and A. Douglas Melamed have suggested
a variation on this standard that Werden refers to as the "no economic
sense" test and which places less emphasis on the level of profits sacrificed. 37 As stated in Department of Justice Brief in Trinko, the standard
evaluates whether conduct "would make no economic sense for the
defendant but for the tendency to eliminate or lessen competition."38
That is, the conduct would not be profit-maximizing absent its anticompetitive effect. This variation is primarily different from the conventional
profit-sacrifice standard because it does not require a showing that there
Distribution]; Mark R. Patterson, The Sacrifice of Profits in Non-Price Predation, 18 ANTITRUST

LJ. 37 (2003); Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11; Melamed, Unifying Principles,

supra note 11; John Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, 115 ECON. J. F244 (2005); Werden,
supra note 10.
35 Werden, supra note 10, at 422 n.35, takes issue with this historical characterization of
the profit-sacrifice test as a more general version of the below-cost pricing test for predatory
pricing. Whatever the chronology, the below-cost pricing test is a specific application of
the profit-sacl'ifice standard. Not that anyone today (except the participants) still care
about how events of 25 years were perceived at the time, but there was great intellectual
turmoil among economists over the Areeda-Turner test and it was in that context that the
original Ordover and Willig article, infra note 36, was written. See also STRATEG Y, PREDATION,
AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (Steven C. Salop ed., FTC 1981) (containing final versions of
articles presented at a FTC conference held in 1980).
56 Robert Bork formulates the test as identifying business practices that "would not be
considered profit-maximizing except for the expectation either that (1) rivals will be driven
from the market, leaving the predator with a market share sufficient to command monopoly
profits, or (2) rivals will be chastened sufficiently to abandon competitive behavior the
predator finds inconvenient or threatening." BORK, supra note 2, at 144. Janusz Ordover
and Robert Willig formulate the test as a "response to a rival that sacrifices part of the
profit that could be earned under competitive circumstances, were the rival to remain
viable, in order to induce exit and gain consequent monopoly profits." Janusz A. Ordover
& Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91
YALE LJ. 8 (1981) [hereinafter Predation]. See also Ordover & Willig, Access and Bundling,
supra note 34, at 9. As discussed in more detail below, the various formulations of the test
could lead to different results in practice.
37 Werden, supra note 10, at 413. Melamed terms this test the "sacrifice" or "business
sense" test. Melamed, Unifying Principles, supra note 11, at 391-92.
38 See Brief for the United States, supra note 8, at 15; see also Pate, supra note 8.
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is a period of time in which the defendant's profits are lower than they
were before the exclusionary conduct was undertaken. The reduction in
profits can be conceptual rather than temporal,39 Although this standard
shares many obvious similarities with the standard version of the profitsacrifice test, the no economic sense conceptualization does resolve some
of the implementation pitfalls of the typical profit-sacrifice formulation
discussed in this article.40
As a literal matter, the profit-sacrifice standard is a test of anticompetitive purpose and intent. That is, if a profit-maximizing firm engages
in conduct that would not be economically rational (i.e., maximally
profitable) absent a reduction in competition, then it can be inferred
that the firm must have intended to cause the anticompetitive effect.
The Supreme Court discussed this role of the profit-sacrifice test to infer
anticompetitive intent in Aspen Skiing41 and Trinko.42 For example, in
Trinko, the Court stated that "[t]he unilateral termination ofa voluntary
(and thus presumably profitable) course of dealing suggested a willingness
to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end."43

Recently, commentators have suggested that the profit-sacrifice test
alternatively could be made the only permissible evidence of anticompetitive purpose or even could be declared the sole liability standard. 44 This
was the position of the government in its amicus brief at the petition
stage in Trinko. 45 Covad also seems to take this position. 46 The mechanics
of the profit-sacrifice test can be illustrated generally with the following
39 Werden characterizes the counterfactual as altering the competition faced by the
defendant, not the defendant's market power. Werden, supra note 10, at 416 n.lO.
40 On the similarities of the "no economic sense" variant to other profit-sacrifice formulations, see also Vickers, supra note 34, at F253. The remainder of this article will refer to
the profit-sacrifice test as including the no economic sense formulation, except where it
is necessary to distinguish between the formulations.
41 In rejecting Ski Co.'s efficiency claims, and concluding in essence that Ski Co. was
motivated solely by anticompetitive intent, the Court utilized a version of the profit-sacrifice
test that looked to ticket revenues forgone by the refusal to cooperate with Highlands.
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608-09 (1985). But see
Elhauge, supra note 34, at 287-88.
42 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
409-10 (2004).
43 [d. at 409. In Trinko, the Court characterized part of Ski Co. 's conduct in the Aspen Skiing
case as motivated by anticompetitive intent in a similar way, stating that "the defendant's
unwillingness to renew the ticket even if compensated at retail price revealed a distinctly
anticompetitive bent." [d.
44 See generaUy Melamed, UnifYing Principles, supra note 11; Patterson, supra note 34;
Werden, supra note 10.
45 See Brief for the United States, supra note 8, at 15; see also Pate, supra note 8.
46 Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See
also supra note 8.
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conceptual example. Suppose that a dominant firm with monopoly power
but competing with a small competitor initially is earning profits with
a net present value of $700. Suppose further that the dominant firm
contemplates engaging in some type of exclusionary conduct that raises
its only rival's cost very substantially and, thereby, causes it to exit. The
dominant firm anticipates that if the exclusionary conduct is undertaken
but for some reason would fail to raise the competitor's costs and cause
it to exit, the dominant firm's profits would be reduced by $100, down
to $600. However, suppose that the firm's internal analysis concludes
the rival would exit and the market price would rise after the exclusionary
conduct is undertaken. As a result, the conduct would be profitable on
balance once its impact on price and exit is taken into account, raising
the dominant firm's anticipated profits from the initial level of $700 up
to $900.
This conduct would be condemned under the profit-sacrifice test. The
dominant firm would not have the economic incentive to undertake the
exclusionary conduct absent its effect on exit and the resulting price
increase because the exclusionary conduct would have been unprofitable, leading to a $lOO profit reduction. Thus, the conduct would not
have made "economic sense.» It is only the anticipated exit-inducing and
price-raising effect that tips the scales in the firm's profitability analysis.
Because the exclusionary conduct would have led to higher prices, the
application of the profit-sacrifice test to these facts also protects consumer welfare.
The profit-sacrifice test, in principle, can be applied to any type of
exclusionary conduct, although the analysis is simpler for some types of
conduct than for others. The exact way in which the profit-sacrifice
standard is implemented can affect the determination of whether or not
allegedly exclusionary conduct passes muster, and there is debate over
the proper way to implement the standard, particularly the assumption
regarding the defendant's output.47 In this article, I assume the profitsacrifice test is implemented by measuring profits relative to a benchmark
of the market price that would have occurred absent the allegedly anticompetitive conduct.
In order to understand how the profit-sacrifice test is used in practice,
the following discussion applies that standard to a variety of types of
47 For example, Ordover and Willig focus on conduct that does not simply disadvantage
competitors, but actually causes them to exit. They refer to the benchmark as the profit
that could be earned "under competitive circumstances, were the rival to remain viable."
This requires that the terms "under competitive conditions" and "were the rival to remain
viable" be defined in a way that the standard can be implemented by a court. See Ordover
& Willig, Predation, supra note 36, at 8.
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conduct-inducement of refusals to deal, incompatible design change,
and predatory pricing-that illustrate how the test can be applied to
exclusionary conduct by a firm as a way of achieving, maintaining, or
enhancing monopoly power.

1. Inducing Refusals to Deal by Independent Input Suppliers
The profit-sacrifice test can be applied to a payment to suppliers for
a refusal to deal. For example, suppose that a dominant firm is currently
selling 500 units at a price of $60 per unit and produces that output at
a constant marginal cost of $50 per unit. Thus, the firm has a profitmargin of $10 per unit (i.e., $60 - $50) and operating profits on the
500 uni ts equal to $5000. Assume further that if the firm's closest com petitor is denied access to a critical input, the firm would be able to raise
its price to $100 and increase its market share and total volume by 100
units. This is because the disadvantaged competitor would have the
incentive to reduce its output and raise its own price. 48 Suppose that
the dominant firm enters into exclusionary vertical agreements with the
critical input suppliers to refuse to supply the competitor, pays these
input suppliers a total of $3000 for the refusal to deal agreements, and
no efficiency benefits (e.g., elimination of free riding) are generated by
the agreements.
Based on these facts, this exclusionary conduct is anticompetitive. It
leads to higher prices paid by consumers. Assuming that there are no
offsetting consumer information or product quality benefits that might
occur if the conduct had eliminated free riding, consumer welfare surely
would fall. Consumer welfare also would fall if there were modest benefits
that were insufficient to reverse or offset the higher prices. 49
Furthermore, this conduct would fail the profit-sacrifice test: It would
make "no economic sense" for the firm to pay the suppliers $3000 unless
the payment would permit the firm to increase the price it could charge
to consumers. This is certainly true at the dominant firm's initial output
level. In fact, if the only impact of the refusal to deal in this example
were that the firm would be able to increase its sales by 100 units at a
constant price of $60, this would contribute incremental profits of only
$1000 (i.e., 100 units @ $10 profit margin). Thus, its profits in this
hypothetical, but-for world, where price remains at $60, would fall by
$2000 (i.e., $3000 - $1000). What makes the conduct profitable, on
48 At the higher price, the total market demand would be lower. But, the dominant firm
can expand its own volume (and market share) by absorbing customers from the nowhigher cost rival, which would have an incentive to shrink.
49 Assessing this tradeoff is discussed in more detail in the product design and costreducing investment examples below.
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balance, for the dominant firm is that the refusal to deal agreements
allow the firm to raise its price by $40 per unit up to $100 on the 600
units that it can sell.
However, suppose that the required payments to input suppliers are
only $500. In this case, consumer welfare still falls because the price rises
by $40, with no offsetting consumer benefits. But the evaluation of profitsacrifice in this case raises the issue ofthe proper treatment of the profits
on the 100 units of incremental retail sales at the but-for benchmark
price of $60. These profits might be counted as "legitimate" profits
because the units are sold at the non-exclusionary price of $60. In
contrast, they might be viewed as "illegitimate" or anticompetitive profits
because the units would not be sold absent the allegedly exclusionary
conduct. 50 This assumption is a contentious issue and often may determine whether or not there is a finding of profit-sacrifice.
2. Incompatible Design Change
The profit-sacrifice test similarly can be applied to the controversial fact
situation of a product design change by a dominant firm with monopoly
power. 51 Suppose that a dominant firm makes a design change that
improves the quality and value of its product to users by $5. 52 However,
at the same time, suppose that the improved design change necessarily
also reduces the compatibility of the monopolist's product with competing products. That is, the incompatibility is "inextricably linked" to the
quality improvement. 53 Moreover, suppose that it is not feasible to

50 The analytic issue is how to implement the concept of "absent the anticompetitive
effect of the conduct." As discussed below, the lack of consensus over this implementation issue would make the profit-sacrifice test more subjective in practice. Defining nonexclusionary profits is discussed in more detail below in Part IV.C. A court cannot simply
conclude that the profits are (or are not) legitimate on the grounds that the conduct
extrinsically is (or is not) procompetitive. This is because the proper role of antitrust
standards is to determine whether the conduct is procompetitive, not the other way around.
51 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54-57 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
52 That is, suppose that the firm would be able to raise its price by $5 if there were not
a change in the degree of competition provided by other firms. Sometimes courts in
contract cases assume perfectly competitive markets and use the market price as the
measure of consumer value. That measure assumes generally that consumers could purchase an identical unit from another seller and that sellers lack market power. Equating
value to price is inappropriate in antitrust. Mter all, that assumption would lead to a
conclusion that monopolization increases the value of a product because its price rises
from the competitive level up to the monopoly level.
53 The "inextricably linked" language is taken from the discussion of efficiencies in the
current version of the Horizon tal Merger Guidelines. U.S. Dep't ofJustice & Federal Trade
Comm'n Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4 n.36 (1992, revised 1997), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11251.pdf [hereinafter Merger Guidelines J.
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continue selling the old compatible product. In this case, the incompatibility is not a naked restraint. 54
Suppose that the incompatibility creates significant barriers to competition to existing competitors and causes enhanced barriers to entry.
The dominant firm consequently gains the ability to raise its price by
far more than the $5 quality improvement. For example, suppose that
the dominant firm is able profitably to raise its price by $50, which it does.
This product improvement might or might not be condemned under
the profit-sacrifice test. The outcome of the test would depend on the
cost of the product improvement. As a hypothetical matter, if there were
no barriers to competition caused by the reduction in compatibility (and
holding outputs constant), the simplest economic model might predict
that the firm would only have had the ability and incentive to raise the
price of its product by $5, which is equivalent to the magnitude of the
product improvement. 55 That would be the benchmark price increase
for the test. The profit-sacrifice test then would condemn the design
change if the investment necessary to achieve the $5 product performance benefits were so high that the investment would not have made
economic sense absent the ability to raise price by more than the $5.
The profit-sacrifice test compares the additional costs to the firm from
the design change against the additional price it could charge in the
hypothetical world. For example, suppose that there are no incremental
investment costs but the variable costs of the higher quality product are
$15 per unit higher than the old product. In this case, it would not be
rational for the dominant firm to spend $15 per unit to gain the power
to raise its price by $5 per unit (holding output constant). Thus, if the
firm chose to adopt the design change in the but-for world, it would
sacrifice profit of $10 per unit.
A court applying the profit-sacrifice test could conclude that a rational
profit-maximizing firm would not have adopted the design change unless
54 If, contrary to the assumptions of the example, the old design could continue to be
sold or if the incompatible product design were more expensive than a compatible design
that delivers the same quality improvement, then the design easily would be condemned
under the profit-sacrifice test. In this situation, the extra cost of creating the incompatibility
would be the focus of the complaint, not the product improvement. It would be argued
that the firm could have achieved the $5 quality improvement at lower cost. The only
rationale for spending more to create an incompatible product would be to permit the
price to be increased by more. A consumer welfare effect standard also would condemn
this conduct, though the reasoning would be different.
55 More complicated economic models might be formulated in which the price increase
would be more or less than $5. Thus, selecting the proper model often would be a
contentious issue if the profit-sacrifice test were used in practice. This issue is discussed
in more detail infra Part IV.C.
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it anticipated that it would be able to raise price by more than $15, its
cost per unit to produce the higher quality product, without losing any
sales. Stated differently, the firm must have anticipated that the design
change would give it the monopoly power profitably to raise price by
far more than the increase in product performance quality. As set out in
the hypothetical, the firm also anticipates that the barriers to competition
flowing from the incompatibility give it the monopoly power to raise
price by $50.
This particular design change would violate the consumer welfare
effect test as well as the profit-sacrifice test, although the reasoning
is somewhat different. The consumer welfare effect test compares the
additional performance benefits to consumers (here, $5) to the additional price they must pay (here, $50). It is obvious that rational consumers would have preferred the old product at the old price.
In contrast, if the design change would cost only $3 more per unit
and the performance benefits were $5, then the conduct would not
be condemned by the profit-sacrifice test. At the hypothetical $5 price
increase in the benchmark world, the firm's profits would rise by $2 per
unit. In this case, the ability to raise price by more than $5 is not necessary
to achieve an increase in profits. However, this design change still would
be condemned under the consumer welfare effect standard because the
price in the real world increases by $50, whereas the value of the product
increases by only $5. This shows that the competitive impact of the
new product design still is clearly adverse to consumers. Only if the
performance benefits exceed $50 would consumers benefit when the
reasonably anticipated price increase is $50. Thus, the profit-sacrifice
standard is more permissive than the consumer welfare standard in this
type of case. The design change satisfies the profit-sacrifice standard as
long as the performance benefits of the product improvement exceed
the cost of the design change, whereas it satisfies the consumer welfare
standard only if the performance benefits exceed the price increase.
Werden goes further. He suggests that courts would and should apply
a "prudential safe harbor" to such new product introductions, as well
as cost-reducing investments. 56 This safe harbor would immunize such
conduct from antitrust liability, even if it fails the profit-sacrifice (or no
economic sense) test. 57
56 Werden, supra note 10, at 418 & nn.21-25. See also Popofsky, Antitrust Rules, supra
note 15.
57 Werden, supra note 10, at 421-22, also would not apply the no economic sense standard
to the "scenarios" where "the inevitable outcome of the competitive process would be a
single surviving competitor" and "aggressive competitive tactics may be required for survival,
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In my view, this methodology would make the analysis circular and
the standard an empty shell. The rationale for using an antitrust standard
is to determine rigorously and objectively whether or not alleged exclusionary conduct is anticompetitive or whether it is "competition on the
merits," not vice versa. If a court separately has already postulated for
other extrinsic reasons that certain exclusionary conduct is "competition
on the merits," then there is no reason to use the standard. Finally, such
safe harbors obviously also would require far more justification than the
perceived "experience" of the court or commentator because of the
conscious or unconscious role of ideology in perceiving reality. Only in
this way can courts maintain the rigor and coherence of antitrust, rather
than reducing it simply to a subjective reflection of the court's general ideology.
3. Predatory Pricing
Brooke Group does not use a true profit-sacrifice standard but rather a
negative-profit standard. 58 However, if a true profit-sacrifice standard were

applied to predatory pricing, it would be less permissive (i.e., more
interventionist) than the below-cost pricing test. To illustrate, suppose
that a monopolist has always priced at the monopoly level of $100. At
some point, suppose that a unique new competitor enters the market
and the monopolist cuts price drastically. Suppose that the low price
saps the entrant's financial resources and causes it to exit permanently
from the market. 59 Suppose that a profit-sacrifice standard were being
used, rather than the Brooke Group below-cost pricing test. In order to
implement the profit-sacrifice test properly, it would be necessary to
determine the price to use as the non-exclusionary benchmark for the
test.
A court might be tempted to treat the pre-entry monopoly price ($100,
in the example) as the non-exclusionary price benchmark for evaluating
profit sacrifice. However, if this price were used as the benchmark, then
yet such tactics would make sense only because of a tendency to eliminate competition."
Courts might not treat this situation as so rare. A defendant might argue that it should
apply to a broad range of exclusionary conduct by a monopolist to maintain its monopoly
in the face of entry by an efficient new competitor, if the monopolist can successfully
argue that the market involves strong network effects or if the market is a natural monopoly.
In contrast, the consumer welfare effect standard would evaluate whether or not the
exclusionary conduct would harm competition, that is, whether it would increase price
and reduce output.
58 For a similar pOint, see Elhauge, supra note 34, at 272-74.
59 Suppose that the entrant could neither simply reduce output without exiting nor reenter in the event that the defendant subsequently increases its price, which implies that
recoupment would be likely. Note also that I am assuming away other potential rationales
for the low prices, such as promotional pricing of new products.
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any price decrease below the initial monopoly level would be found to
involve profit-sacrifice. Using a pre-entry monopoly price as the benchmark could lead to false positives because the profit-sacrifice test would
catch welfare-enhancing price competition in response to entry into a
monopolized market as well as attempts to drive rivals out of business
in the hope of raising prices after their exit.
Thus, the initial monopoly price would not be the proper nonexclusionary benchmark for the profit-sacrifice test. The proper benchmark is the market price that would prevail if the entrant had sufficient
financial resources to survive a price war (i.e., if there would be no exit
for the rival and no recoupment for the predator). Mter entry into the
monopolized market, the now-former monopolist generally would have
an incentive to reduce its price to compete, even ifit were not attempting
to start a war of attrition to cause the entrant to exit from the market. 50
In most cases, the firm would not cut its price all the way down to
marginal cost, and marginal cost pricing is unlikely to be the oligopoly
market equilibrium if the entrant remained a viable competitor. 61 Thus,
the Brooke Group below-cost pricing test does not measure true profitsacrifice. 62
60 If the entrant has very limited capacity and no ability to grow, it is possible that the
monopolist instead might maximize its profits by holding its price at the monopoly level
and ceding this limited number of sales to the new entrant, rather than reducing price
to all of its customers. However, this scenario would be the exception, not the rule. See
Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Pley, and the Lean and
Hungry Look, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 361 (1984); Judith R. Gelman & Steven C. Salop, Judo
Economics: Capacity Limitation and Coupon Competition, 14 BELL]. ECON. 315, 315 (1983).
61 Marginal cost pricing would be the market equilibrium only under very limited market
conditions: the firms sell perfectly homogeneous products; the firms are equally efficient;
and each firm assumes that its price choice will have no impact on its rival's price. In
contrast, price equal to marginal cost would not be the outcome for a duopoly market
where the incumbent and an equally efficient entrant sell differentiated products. Nor
would it be the outcome if the incumbent and the entrant would tacitly coordinate
imperfectly, again assuming that the entrant remained viable. In either case, if the entrant
remained viable, the equilibrium market prices would exceed the firms' marginal costs.
62 Ordover and Willig recognized this issue in their article on the role of profit-sacrifice
test in predatory pricing. However, they chose to use the profit level at the perfectly
competitive outcome (i.e., where price equals marginal cost) as one key benchmark for
their modified profit-sacrifice test. They refer to this modified benchmark with the proviso
that it is the outcome "under competitive conditions." See Ordover & Willig, Predation,
sUfrra note 36, at 10. Werden states that the no economic sense test can only be properly
applied if "the defendant's choices can be narrowed down to a few, only one of which
includes the challenged conduct." Werden, sufrra note 10, at 420. In predatory pricing,
there is a continuum of price choices so the test could not be properly applied, if a court
wanted to do so, instead of simply making a price-cost comparison. Brooke Group is not a
true profit-sacrifice standard for another reason. The recoupment prong of that standard
evaluates whether the defendant's investment in predation likely would be profitable, not
whether it would be unprofitable absent any price-raising effect. It is a test of the rationality
of the overall strategy, not the irrationality of the conduct in a hypothetical world. For
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It might be argued that a price equal to marginal cost is a good non-

exclusionary price benchmark because that price level would be efficient
and, therefore, not anticompetitive. However, this defense of using marginal cost as the benchmark for the profit-sacrifice test is circular, as
discussed above.
C. THE EQUALLY EFFICIENT COMPETITOR STANDARD

Another possible rationale for the below-cost pricing standard in Brooke
Group is to protect an equally-efficient entrant from being excluded from
the market. Judge Posner has suggested applying this standard to all
exclusionary conduct, not just predatory pricing: under the equally efficient competitor standard, the plaintiff would need to prove that the
conduct "is likely in the circumstances to exclude from the defendant's
market an equally or more efficient competitor."63
The fundamental problem with applying the equally efficient entrant
standard to RRC conduct is that the unencumbered (potential) entry
of less-efficient competitors often raises consumer welfare. For example,
consider the simplest example of limit pricing by a monopolist that has
obtained its monopoly legitimately with superior skill, foresight, and
industry. Suppose that this monopolist has variable costs of $20, and
initially charges the unconstrained monopoly price of $50, when the
monopolist faces no threat of entry.64
Now suppose that there is a new entry threat by a less-efficient firm
with variable costs of $40. Facing this threat, the monopolist would have
the incentive to reduce its price to the "limit price" of $39 in order to
deter the entry into the monopolized market. This potential entrant
would not produce any output but it would act as a perceived potential
entrant, constraining the monopolist's price by waiting in the wings. Its
potential for entry reduces price, increases market output, and raises
both consumer welfare and total economic welfare. 65
further discussion of recoupment as an "investment test," see Kenneth C. Elzinga & David
E. Mills, Testingfor Predation: Is Recoupment Feasible?, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 869 (1989).
63 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 194-95 (2d ed.
2001). Posner would also require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant has monopoly
power. The defendant could rebut by showing that the conduct is efficient. For other
commentaries on this standard, see Elhauge, supra note 37, at 273; Ken Heyer, A World
of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST LJ. 375, 419 n.64
(2005) (quotingJoseph Farrell, Comments at Antitrust Division Conference on the Developments in the Law and Economics of Exclusionary Pricing Practices (Mar. 18, 2004»;
Cavil, Dominant Finn Distribution, supra note 34, at 59-61; Vickers, supra note 34, at F256.
64 Assume for simplicity of the example that the firm has no sunk capital or fixed costs
and its variable costs are constant for all output levels.
65 There would be a reduction in "production efficiency" if the entrant actually produced
output because its costs are higher than the monopolist's. But, it does not produce any
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Suppose next that the monopolist engages in naked RRC conduct that
raises the entrant's costs above $50. For example, suppose that it raises
the entrant's costs by $12 to a cost of $52. The entrant then would lose
the ability to prevent the monopolist from charging the monopoly price
of $50. As a result, consumers would be harmed by the RRC conduct,
and total welfare would fall.
However, no antitrust liability would attach to this RRC conduct under
Posner's equally efficient entrant rule. This is because a $12 cost increase
would not deter an equally efficient potential entrant with costs of $20.
If the monopolist were to maintain its price at the $50 monopoly price,
that equally efficient entrant would still be able to enter successfully
even if its costs increased from $20 to $32.
This example may be simple and somewhat stylized, but it is certainly
within the mainstream of antitrust. The idea that a perceived potential
entrant can constrain the pricing of a monopolist is a central idea in
the analysis of entry barriers, potential competition, and market power.
If the equally efficient entrant standard fails in this simple RRC example,
then it also is likely to be significantly flawed for evaluating non-price
exclusionary conduct more generally.66

D. THE CONSUMER WELFARE EFFECT STANDARD
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is concerned with agreements that
"unreasonably" restrain trade. 67 This standard generally is interpreted as
an anticompetitive effect test that focuses on the net impact on consumer
welfare, that is, market price and outpUt. 68 This same type of fact-based
output. Note also that production efficiency benefits not passed on to consumers would
not count as part of consumer welfare.
66 For example, in discussing this standard in the context of a fraudulent patent claim,
Professor Hovenkamp states that it would be "unreasonably lenient and even perverse. It
exonerates the defendant in precisely those circumstances when the conduct is most likely
to be unreasonably exclusionary." Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72
U. CHI. L. REv. 147, 154 (2005).
67 See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard
Oil Co. of NJ. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
68 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, lO3-04 (1984). Note that there is also
controversy over whether the appropriate antitrust goal is consumer welfare or aggregate
welfare (i.e., efficiencies), as suggested by Bork's use of the Williamson diagram. BORK,
supra note 2, at 107-lO (citing Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The
Welfare TradeoJJs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18 (1968)). For criticisms of Bork's position, see
Robert H. Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were Passed to Protect Consumers
(Not Just to Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS L. REv. 959, (1999); John Kirkwood, Consumers,
Economics and Antitrust, 21 REs. IN L. & ECON. 1 (2004). With respect to exclusiohary
conduct, the aggregate welfare standard is inconsistent with a view that antitrust is for the
protection of consumers rather than competitors. Consider the following two examples.
First, in an exclusionary conduct case under Section 2, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff
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competitive effects analysis could be applied to exclusionary conduct
under Section 2. Under this standard, one would conclude that exclusionary conduct violates the antitrust laws if it reduces competition without
creating a sufficient improvement in performance to fully offset these
potential adverse effect on prices and thereby prevent consumer harm. 69
Such conduct could be labeled "unreasonably exclusionary."7o
This is a very general antitrust standard. For example, if the factbased analysis indicates that the exclusionary conduct likely increases or
maintains barriers to competition or entry and likely leads to higher
prices, then the exclusionary conduct would be condemned unless the
evidence of likely and substantial procompetitive benefits is so strong
that consumers are unlikely to be harmed. This analysis would involve
a variety of evidence relevant to evaluating competitive effect, including
both structural and behavioral evidence, and would be tightly focused
on determining the impact on consumers. Profit-sacrifice evidence also
could be relevant, but proof of profit sacrifice would be neither necessary
nor sufficient to a liability finding.
This competitive effects-based antitrust standard essentially would
compare the beneficial and harmful competitive aspects of the alleged
exclusionary conduct in order to determine the overall impact on consumers. This is the type of competitive effects analysis contemplated in
the Merger Guidelines. 7l It is not intended to be an open-ended inquiry
or involve "some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and
credits."72 Despite the use of the technical economic term "consumer
to prove significant injury to competitors. The plaintiff must also show injury to consumers.
Under a total welfare standard, harm to competitors would be a cognizable harm, independent of the harm to consumers. Indeed, harm to competitors would be given the same
weight as benefits to consumers. In fact, harm to competitors could be used to trump
smaller consumer benefits. Second, suppose that a low cost firm hires an arsonist to destroy
the factory of its higher cost competitor. That conduct would increase the efficiency of
market production by moving production from the high cost firm to the low cost firm.
If the resulting price increase is not too large, aggregate welfare nonetheless would rise
from this exclusionary conduct but consumer welfare would fall. Yet, it seems clear that
no court would permit the efficiency defense in this case. See Salop & Romaine, supra
note 14, at 646-47; Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust
Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard (Working Paper, Nov.
2005) (manuscript on file with author).
69 These competitive benefits are often referred to the as the "efficiencies" created by
the conduct. For example, suppose that a merger to monopoly would increase prices from
$50 to $100 if it had no impact on costs. However, suppose that the merger also reduces
the marginal costs of the merged firm by 30%. That cost decrease would tend to push
price below $100, but not necessarily to $50 or less. Only if the price remains at $50 or
less would consumer harm be avoided.
70 Hovenkamp, sUfrra note 66, at 155.
71 See Merger Guidelines, supra note 53, § 2.
72 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963).
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welfare," the evaluation is really about whether consumers are harmed
from higher prices, reduced quality, or (in some cases) reduced innovation Thus, a better term might well be a "consumer harm" standard
rather than a "consumer welfare effect" standard. 73
A useful reference point is the type of competitive effects analysis of
"market power harms" in mergers suggested by the Merger Guidelines. 74
In the analysis of unilateral competitive effect, for example, the recapture
of customers diverted to one's merger partner creates upward price
pressure. Cost savings generated by the merger potentially create downward price pressure. The competitive threat of entry and repositioning
also constrains the upward price pressure. Putting together the evidence
on these three elements permits the agency or court to gauge the likely
net effect of the merger on prices and output. This same type of competitive analysis can be applied to exclusionary conduct under Section 2.
Thus, alternative names for the standard could be a "competitive effect"
or "competitive injury" standard.
The exact name of the standard is not important. What is important
is that this test focuses on the effect of the conduct on the market,
that is, consumers and the competitive process. In contrast, the other
standards-profit sacrifice, no economic sense, equally efficient
competitor-are focused instead on the impact of the conduct on the
alleged miscreant. This is the key reason why the other standards are
flawed.
The role of balancing in the consumer welfare effect standard is a
potential source of confusion. 75 In carrying out this analysis, the courts
would not engage in self-conscious, open-ended balancing of the magnitudes of benefits and harms using some subjective social weighting. 76
The consumer welfare effect test is not like the situation envisioned
under a Williamsonian total welfare (efficiencies) standard, where harm
suffered by consumers is balanced off against the benefits gained by the
monopolist. 77 This consumer welfare analysis is more geared towards
Vickers, supra note 34, at F258.
See Merger Guidelines, supra note 53, § 2.2.
75 I am one source of this confusion, having previously referred to the consumer welfare
effect standard as a balancing test, apparently without sufficient clarification of the use of
the term. See Salop & Romaine, supra note 14, at 618.
76 See Brief for the United States, supra note 8, at 11 n.2 ("The application of Section 2
does not entail an open-ended '"balancing" of social gains against competitive harms.'
and 'a firm is under no obligation to sacrifice its own profits,' but unlawful exclusionary
acts are those that 'do not benefit consumers ... or ... produce harms disproportionate
to the resulting benefits.'") (citing 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, m1651a, 658f,
at 72, 131-132, 135).
77 BORK, supra note 2, at 107-10.
73

74
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comparing the magnitudes of various effects to predict the likely overall
impact on consumers. 78
The finder of fact generally would compare and weigh the magnitude
and credibility of evidence on both the procompetitive and anticompetitive sides to evaluate which evidence is stronger on balance. 79 Juries
routinely weigh the credibility of opposing experts with differing views
of the net effect of the challenged conduct. Alternatively, instead of
formally comparing the effect on price and quality impacts of the
increased market power with the lower costs and superior product performance, a court may reach the same result by setting the competitive
benefits standard higher the greater are the market power harms shown. 80
For example, in a case in which the plaintiff has shown significant market
power harms, the court may be more likely to find that the defendant
has failed to demonstrate its benefits claims.
Similarly, in merger law, courts use a sliding-scale standard in which
more compelling rebuttal evidence is required for a stronger prima facie
case set out by the government. For example, as explained by Judge
(now Justice) Thomas in Baker Hughes, the defendant can rebut a prima
facie case by demonstrating that the merger will not have anticompetitive effects. 81
The more compelling the prima facie case, the more evidence the
defendant must present to rebut it successfully. A defendant can make
the required showing by affirmatively showing why a given transaction
78 In the context of deciding whether to apply the per se rule to a category of conduct,
the Court in Sylvania described the evidentiary balancing as follows: "The probability
that anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the severity of those
consequences must be balanced against its pro-competitive consequences." Continental
T.V. v. CTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,50 n.16 (1977). In evaluating an entire category
of conduct, some fraction of the particular uses of the conduct by particular firms may
lead to harm and some other fraction of particular uses by other firms may lead to benefits,
and the probabilities are applied to the fraction of each outcome. Similarly, in evaluating
a specific use of the conduct by a specific firm under a fact-based rule of reason, the
relevant probabilities would be the likelihoods that the use of the conduct by the specific
firm at a specific time would lead to either higher or lower prices and consumer welfare.
79 That the consumer welfare effect analysis is stated in a quantitative way in this article
and others is not unexpected in an area like antitrust, which is now so firmly rooted in
economic analysis. But, it generally would not be necessary for the fact finder to attach
numbers to the probabilities and strength of the evidence on each side. As Judge Posner
put the point in the context of his algebraic formula for deciding whether to grant a
preliminary i~unction, the formula "is intended not to force analysis into a quantitative
straitjacket but to assist analysis by presenting succinctly the factors that the court must
consider in making its decision and by articulating the relationship among the factors."
American Hosp. Supply Corp. v Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986)
80 For a similar analysis, see Cavil, Dominant Firm Distribution, supra note 34, at 78-79.
81 United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also FTC v. HJ.
Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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is unlikely to substantially lessen competition, or by discrediting the
data underlying the initial presumption in the government's favor. 82
As in any antitrust case, the difficult and controversial issue is setting

the appropriate standard for proof and the burden of proof placed on
the plaintiff. 83 The consumer harm threshold, in principle, could be
one of plausibility, tendency, significant likelihood, and so on, up to
absolute certainty.
Areeda and Hovenkamp also seem to contemplate a consumer welfare
effect standard in RRC cases. They say that exclusionary conduct "requires
actual or prospective consumer harm."84 They define (anticompetitive)
exclusionary conduct as acts that:
(1) are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging, or prolonging

monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of rivals; and
(2) that either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits that the acts produce or
(2c) produce harms disproportionate to the resulting benefits. 85

Regarding the standard of proof, Areeda and Hovenkamp also observe
that while "an expectation of consumer harm must always be at the
logical end of any determination that a particular act 'monopolizes,' ...
this is not the same thing as showing that consumer harm has in fact
resulted from the challenged practice."86 Harm may "be threatened
rather than realized."87

1. The Section 2 Consumer Welfare Effect Standard in the Case Law
A consumer welfare effect standard for evaluating the Section 2 liability
flows directly from the Court's observation that antitrust is a "consumer
welfare prescription. "88 Such a standard was adopted explicitly by the
Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 992.
See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST LJ.
693 (2000); David A. Balto & Ernest A. Nagata, Proof of Competitive Effects in Monopolization
Cases: A Response to Professcrr Mum, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 309 (2000); Timothy J. Muris,
Anticompetitive Effects in Monopolization Cases: Reply, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 325 (2000); see also
Baker, supra note 24.
84 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, 'II 651d, at 79.
85 [d. 'II 651a, at 72.
86 [d. 'II 651d, at 80. The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise uses the example of arresting
drunken drivers before they actually kill someone. [d.
87 [d. 'II 651d, at 80.
82

83

BS Reiterv. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). Even this conclusion is not devoid
of controversy, however. Compare Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper
Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, Statement
Presented to the Antitrust Modernization Commission, available at http://www.amc.gov/
public_studiesjr28902/exclus_conduccpdf/051104_Salop_Mergers.pdf; Charles F. (Rick)
Rule, Consumer Welfare, Efficiencies, and Mergers, Statement Presented to the Antitrust
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D.C. Circuit in United States v. Microsojt,89 in which the court outlined a
test requiring the plaintiff to prove that consumers would be harmed. 90
If that showing is made, then the monopolist may offer a procompetitive
justification for its conduct. 91 This justification then must be either invalidated by the plaintiff or the beneficial impact on consumers must be
shown to be outweighed by the evidence of anticompetitive consumer
harm. 92 In this way, the likely effect on consumer welfare is predicted.
The court, making the point that this standard is similar to the analysis
that courts routinely carry out under the Section 1 rule of reason,93
quoted the Supreme Court's seminal Standard Oil opinion, stating:
[W]hen the second section [of the Shennan Act] is thus hannonized
with ... the first, it becomes obvious that the criterion to be resorted
to in any given case for the purpose of ascertaining whether violations
of the section have been committed, is the rule of reason guided by
the established law. 94
Modernization Commission, available at http://www.amc.gov/commission_hearings/pdf/
Statement-Rule. pdf
89 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In Microsoft, the
court did little explicit balancing because there generally was nothing to balance. For some
conduct, Microsoft lacked a cognizable procompetitive justification. For other conduct, the
government failed to offer evidence that the consumer harm exceeded the benefits that
the court attributed to the conduct. However, the court claimed to balance benefits and
harms with respect to its analysis of Microsoft's licensing restriction. For that conduct, the
court concluded that the prohibition on OEMs automatically launching a substitute user
interface upon completion of the boot process was necessary to prevent a "substantial
alteration" of Microsoft's copyrighted work and "outweighs the marginal anticompetitive
effect" of the prohibition. Id. at 63. For certain other conduct, the court appeared to
apply a non-balancing framework. For a discussion of this latter point, see Popofsky, New
Frontier, supra note 15.
90 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-59.
91Id. at 59.
92Id.
95 As stated by the court, "In cases arising under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the courts
routinely apply a similar balancing approach under the rubric of the 'rule of reason.'"
Id. at 59. In this regard, compare the D.C. Circuit's formulation in Microsoft to the Second
Circuit's language on Section 1 in United States v. VISA USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d
Cir. 2003) ("For the government to prevail in a rule of reason case under § 1, the district
court concluded, and the parties do not argue otherwise, that the following must be
shown: As an initial matter, the government must demonstrate that the defendant conspirators have 'market power' in a particular market for goods or services. Next, the government
must demonstrate that within the relevant market, the defendants' actions have had
substantial adverse effect on competition, such as increases in price, or decreases in
output or quality. Once that initial burden is met, the burden of production shifts to the
defendants, who must provide a procompetitive justification for the challenged restraint.
If the defendants do so, the government must prove either that the challenged restraint
is not reasonably necessary to achieve the defendants' procompetitive justifications, or
that those objectives may be achieved in a manner less restrictive of free competition.")
See also Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 27, §§ 1.2, 3.37.
94 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911».
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Aspen Skiing95 also used language that suggests the use of consumer
welfare effect as the overarching liability standard. First, the Court explicitly stated the relevance of "impact on consumers."96 Second, the jury
instruction summation (affirmed by the Court) asked whether the defendant's conduct was "designed primarily to further any domination of the
relevant market or sub-market."97 This formulation admits the potential
for multiple motives and the resulting need to compare evidence of
opposing effects. Third, the Court asked whether the conduct "has
impaired competition in an unnecessarily restrictive way." 98 This formulation is similar to the "reasonably necessary" language used in Section 1
cases. 99 Evaluating whether the exclusion is "unnecessarily restrictive"
(or "unreasonably exclusionary") requires some method of comparing
the evidence of conflicting motives and effects, which the consumer
welfare effect standard provides. Applying this standard to the facts, the
Court in Aspen Skiing also found that the comparison was not difficult.
The jury concluded that Ski Co.'s conduct was not justified by "any
normal business purpose."IOO

This type of consumer-oriented competitive effect analysis also was
embraced by the FTC in the 1980 du Pont decision regarding DuPont's
expansion of its titanium dioxide production capacity. The FTC referred
to its analysis as a "rule of reason-type approach," which suggests its
relationship to Section 1 analysis. 1ol As Commissioner Clanton opined,
"we believe that there is no substitute for a careful, considered look at
the overall competitive effect of the practices under scrutiny."lo2 However, the profit-sacrifice test also figured in the Commission's determination because complaint counsel argued that DuPont's conduct involved
profit sacrifice, a claim that was rejected by the Commission.

Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
[d. at 605.
97 [d. at 597 (emphasis added).
98 [d. at 605. The Court cites the Areeda and Turner treatise, referring to conduct that
not only impairs rivals, but also "either does not further competition on the merits or
does so only in an unnecessarily restrictive way." [d. at 605 (citing 3 PHILLIP AREEDA &
DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 78 (1978»; see also Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609
F.2d 843, 853 (6th Cir. 1979). The term "unnecessarily restrictive" suggests that the finn's
procompetitive goal could have been achieved with conduct that would have permitted
more competition.
99 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 115 (1984) (NCAA's television plan was not
"necessary to enable the NCAA to penetrate the market" (emphasis added»; see also United
States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658,669 (3d Cir. 1993).
100 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. 585, 608.
101 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 1980 FTC LEXIS 14, at ~ 160 (1980).
102 [d., 1980 LEXIS at ~ 201.
95

96
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2. Applying the Consumer Welfare Effect Standard
Antitrust law focuses on consumer welfare (in particular, preventing
economic harm to purchasers from anticompetitive conduct), not the
defendant's profits or the protection of competitors. Therefore, the
consumer welfare effect standard is useful because it is a fact-based
analysis of the competitive effect of the allegedly anticompetitive monopolizing conduct. 103 In most antitrust cases, the profit-sacrifice and consumer welfare effect standards will reach the same outcome. However,
there is no reason to think that the impact on the defendant's profits
in the hypothetical world of the profit-sacrifice test would be a good proxy
for the impact on consumers. Therefore, highlighting those situations in
which the two standards are likely to diverge is critical to a comparative
analysis. These obviously are the "harder cases." But only by looking at
the harder cases can the standards properly be evaluated and compared.
a. Inducing Refusals to Deal by Independent Input Suppliers
In the example used previously to illustrate the profit-sacrifice test, it
was assumed that a dominant firm is initially selling 500 units at a price
of $60 per unit and earning profits of $5000. It also was assumed that
if the firm's closest competitor is denied access to a critical input sold
by a number of input suppliers, then the firm would be able to raise its
price to $100 because the disadvantaged competitor would have the
incentive to reduce its output and raise its own price. The alleged exclusionary conduct involves exclusionary vertical agreements with the critical
input suppliers to refuse to supply the competitor in exchange for fees
of $3000 for refusal to deal agreements that lack any efficiency benefits
(e.g., elimination of free riding).
Based on these facts, this exclusionary conduct is anticompetitive and
would violate the consumer welfare standard because it causes consumers
to pay higher prices, with no offsetting consumer information or quality
benefits that might occur if the conduct had eliminated free riding.
Consumer welfare also would fall if there were modest benefits that were
insufficient to reverse or offset the higher prices.
There would be no liability, however, if consumers could turn easily
to other competitors who continue to sell a homogeneous product at
the initial $60 price. In this scenario, consumers would not be harmed

103 For a general analysis of the application of the consumer welfare effect standard to
specific RRC exclusionary conduct. see Krattenmaker & Salop. supra note 22.
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by the agreements, despite the fact that the agreements harm competitors
and lack any efficiency benefits. 104
It might be argued that this scenario would be highly unexpected.
First, the other unrestrained competitors might have the ability and
incentive to raise their prices above $60 once some of their rivals are
denied access to the critical input. But, that result does not follow as a
matter of logic and is not always the case in practice. It depends on the
number and excess capacity of the unrestrained competitors and their
ability to successfully coordinate prices. 105 Second, it might seem that
the defendant would lack an incentive to pay input suppliers to refuse
to deal in this situation. But, as discussed in the earlier analysis of the
profit-sacrifice standard, the defendant's profits nonetheless may
increase because it is able to expand its sales at the $60 price. For
example, if its sales would increase by 100 units and its profit margin
were more than $30 per unit (as opposed to the $10 assumed in the
hypothetical), these increased profits would exceed the $3000 paid to
the input suppliers for the exclusion.

b. Predatory Pricing
In Brooke Group, the Court did not adopt an explicit consumer welfare
effect standard, opting instead for its two-prong test of whether there
was below-cost pricing and a dangerous probability of recoupment. lOG
Predatory pricing delivers short-run benefits to consumers in the form
of lower prices during the predatory period and, if the predation is
successful, higher prices (and consumer welfare losses) during the
recoupment period. If a court were to apply the consumer welfare effect
test to predatory pricing, the defendant's strategy would violate the
consumer harm standard only if the net present value of consumer
welfare decreased from the conduct. That is, the court would evaluate
whether the consumer benefits from lower prices achieved during the
predatory period outweigh the likely harm during the recoupment
period, taking into account the time value of money.107 Thus, the
104 If the products were differentiated, then consumers would be harmed from the
reduction in variety and consumer choice. This finding could form the basis for antitrust
liability under the consumer welfare standard. However, it is not clear that a court would
treat the reduction in variety and choice as sufficient for liability. For further discussion
of this policy issue, see infra note 193. See also Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop,
Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Aptnvach, 63 ANTITRUST LJ. 513, 548-49 (1995).
105 For further analysis, see Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 2.
106 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-23
(1993).
107 The Brooke Group recoupment test evaluates the likelihood that the predator would
be able to raise price subsequently. This recoupment analysis could be used as part of the
evaluation of the impact on consumers but the two calculations are not identical.
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consumer welfare effect standard could be more or less permissive than
either the Brooke Group or the profit-sacrifice standard, depending upon
the exact facts. 108
c. Incompatible Design Change
As discussed earlier, if the profit-sacrifice standard were applied to an
incompatible design change that is a necessary, inextricable feature of the
performance improvement, that standard would compare the increase in
product value to consumers from the design change to the defendant's
increased cost of the improved product. 109 This increased value would
be compared to the increased cost in order to gauge whether the firm's
profits would increase in the hypothetical world. In the example, the
increased value was $5 per unit. If the increased cost were $3 per unit,
then the conduct would pass muster. It would be condemned under a
profit-sacrifice test if the unit cost increase were $6. Thus, the profitsacrifice standard requires the court (or the firm) to quantify the value
of the product improvement to consumers and compare that change in
value to the increased cost of producing the improved product.

Under the consumer welfare effect standard, the relevant antitrust
question is whether the evidence better supports the view that the overall
effect of the design change is procompetitive rather than anticompetitive,
i.e., whether consumers are benefited or harmed. The court would focus
on the quality-adjusted price. It would compare the increased value of
the new product to the increased price paid by consumers, not to the
increased cost borne by the defendant.
This consumer effect analysis could find antitrust liability despite the
fact that the conduct involves a product improvement because the
improvement in the hypothetical is inextricably linked to the elimination
of compatibility and the resulting diminution of competition. For example, suppose the combination of the product improvement and incompatibility permits the dominant firm to raise its price for the new product
by $50 but the increased value to consumers is only $5. ll0 On these facts,
108 It could be more permissive because the strategy may not reduce the net present
value of consumer welfare, even if there is below-cost pricing. It could be less permissive
because it would not be necessary to show below-cost pricing. See Edlin, supra note 24.
109 See supra Part II.B.2. Simply showing the new product is qualitatively better is not
sufficient to escape liability because the price increase in the hypothetical benchmark world
would be assumed to be equal to the increased value of the new product's performance.
110 As discussed previously, if the incompatibility were not a reasonably necessary byproduct of the product improvement (for example, if a compatible version could be
produced at the same cost, or if the older compatible version also still could be made
available), then the incompatibility itself would be attacked. Absent the costly reduction
in compatibility, consumers would have obtained the product improvement and continued
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the quality-adjusted price clearly rises and consumer welfare is reduced
because paying $50 extra for $5 worth of product improvements is a
bad deal for the consumers who purchase the product. The product
improvement is valued by consumers, but not by enough when it comes
unavoidably bundled with increased barriers to competition that permit
such large price increases.
Of course, if the product improvements were large enough, the result
would change. For example, suppose that the product improvements
raised the performance value to consumers by $60 instead of $5. In that
case, even paying $50 more for the product would reduce the qualityadjusted price and raise consumer welfare, if the incompatibility and
resulting exclusion of competitors are necessary to achieve the $60
increase in value.
This analysis has assumed that the ex post market outcome of the
innovation was certain. However, in the real world, innovation often is
an uncertain process. It is possible that at the time that the innovation
was made, the innovator could not reasonably expect the innovation to
allow it to raise price disproportionately to the consumer benefits. The
fact that the new product turned out to be incompatible, and the fact
that the rivals were unable to re-achieve compatibility, may have been a
surprise. In those circumstances, a purely ex post analysis could lead to
false positives. III Instead, the conduct would be evaluated from an ex
ante perspective, based on the information reasonably available at the
time that the innovator made its investment decision.1l2
d. Cost-Reducing Investments
A common concern about the consumer welfare effect standard is
that it might be used to condemn a simple cost reduction by a firm with
market power. To analyze this issue, consider the following example.
Two firms are competing by selling differentiated products. The larger
firm has variable costs of $20 per unit and the smaller firm has variable
costs of $40. Because they produce differentiated products, their prices
exceed their variable costs. Suppose that the low-cost firm charges $50
and the high-cost firm charges $60. 113 Furthermore, assume the low-cost
competition. The profit-sacrifice standard would lead to the same result in this scenario.
This issue about the availability of the old product was raised in the Berkey case, though
in that matter, Kodak continued to sell the old type of film. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 n.39.
III It could lead to false negatives in situations where the price likely would rise but
turned out not to increase.
112 This issue is discussed in more detail below. See infra Part 11.0.3.
113 The low-cost firm might be able to obtain a 100% market share by reducing its price
significantly, but the example assumes that this would not be the profit-maximizing strategy.
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firm has a much higher market share, say 85 percent, and that there are
barriers that would prevent entry by any other competitors.
Given these initial conditions, suppose that the low-cost firm has an
opportunity to invest in a proprietary new lower-cost production technology that would push its production costs down from $20 to $5. Assume
the firm makes this capital investment and reduces its price to $30, at
which point the smaller firm files a Section 2 complaint claiming that
it is unable to match the lower production costs and will be forced to
exit from the market. To focus on the differences between the standards,
suppose that the smaller firm can establish that, once it exits, it would
be unable to re-enter the market in the future, even if the larger firm
subsequently raises its price. Il4
If the smaller firm alleges that the larger firm's capital investment in
the new, more efficient technology is an anticompetitive exclusionary
investment (i.e., because the firm's investment that will raise the plaintiff's investment costs to a prohibitive level and cause it to exit from the
market, allowing the larger firm to achieve a durable monopoly), how
would this complaint be treated under the profit-sacrifice and consumer
welfare effect tests?
Some commentators Il5 and courts Il6 might want to take the position
that such cost-reducing investments should be permissible per se, regardless of their effect on consumers. But, the profit-sacrifice standard could
be applied to this conduct, and the investment strategy could be condemned under the profit-sacrifice test, depending on the magnitude of
the investment cost of the new technology. In particular, suppose that
it was reasonably foreseeable by the firm that an adequate return on this
investment cost only could be recovered by driving the rival out of
business and raising price. In this case, the strategy would fail the profitsacrifice test (including the no economic sense version) because it would
114 If the smaller firm alleges predatory pricing in its complaint, it would lose under
Brooke Group because the larger firm is not pricing below its costs.
115 See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 34, at 316-20. In this case, the smaller firm was less
efficient even before the larger firm's cost-reducing investment so that the equally efficient
competitor standard also would not be violated. Werden would place such cost-reducing
conduct in a safe harbor. Werden, supra note 10, at 419 n.25.
116 For example, perhaps Judge Douglas Ginsburg had something like this in mind with
his statement in Cuuad that if Bell Atlantic's deceptive advertising forced Covad to increase
its own advertising in response, "competition was only enhanced." Covad Communications.
Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2005). However, what seems peculiar
about this statement is that the allegation involved deceptive advertising, not a simple cost
reduction. Deceptive advertising directly harms consumers and potentially raises rivals'
counter-advertising costs. Judge Ginsburg simply assumes away the possibility of anticompetitive effect.
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be unprofitable on balance, absent the lessening of competition caused
by the plaintiff's exit and the subsequent price rise. 1I7
Under the consumer welfare effect standard, the plaintiff would need
to prove that it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff might exit
rather than emulate the larger firm's investment strategy and reduce its
own costs (which would have prevented price from rising and harming
consumers). The plain tiff also would need to prove that consumers likely
would be injured from the strategy. Even assuming that exit and the
subsequent price increase was certain, consumer harm is not inevitable
from the overall strategy, taking into account the consumer benefits
achieved during the interim period when the market prices were lower.
The consumer welfare effect standard is not a vague and open-ended
balancing test but rather involves the calculation of the "average" price,
taking into account the volume of sales at the different prices over time
and the time value of money.llS Proving consumer harm would not
be easy.
Thus, it is not clear that the defendant has much to fear here from
the consumer welfare effect standard. First, under the consumer welfare
effect standard, the plaintiff would have the burden, not the defendant.
It is not clear that the plaintiff would have the burden under the profitsacrifice test. 1I9 Second, it is not clear that the consumer welfare effect
standard would be more restrictive than the profit-sacrifice standard in
this case and may well be less restrictive.

3. Applying the Consumer Welfare Effect Standard Ex Ante
This example of cost-reducing investment raises an important point
about the consumer welfare effect standard that may be misunderstood.
In this type of case, the consumer welfare effect analysis generally would
be an ex ante analysis, not an ex post analysis. That is, the court would
evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of expected consumer benefits
or harms based on the information reasonably available at the time that
the conduct was undertaken. It would not simply examine the ultimate
ex post market effect. This timing makes sense because any deterrence
117 This test assumes that the benchmark for the profit-sacrifice evaluation uses the initial
prices and quantities of both firms. As discussed below, another possible implementation
of the profit-sacrifice test would use the initial prices as the price benchmark but allow
the quantities to adjust to the new costs. This test is more permissive, but it still might be
failed for a cost reduction if the higher price is also needed to achieve profitability.
118 The plaintiff's task also would be made more difficult because the low prices are
achieved in the present while the high prices occur in the future and because downwardsloping demand curves mean that more units are sold at low prices than at high prices.
119 The defendant may well be assigned the burden with the profit-sacrifice test because
it controls the relevant evidence. See infra Part IV.D.
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only could take place on the basis of ex ante information and because
the defendant is not compensated by the judicial system when consumer
welfare increases. 120 Thus, a key issue would be what consumer effect
was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the investment. (Similarly, the
profit sacrifice standard also would be carried out on an ex ante basis. 121 )
This foreseeability analysis can be illustrated with the cost-reducing
investment example. Suppose that, at the time that the investment was
made, the firm understood that there were two possible market outcomes.
In one scenario, the rival would achieve its own matching cost reductions
through its own investments, in which case prices would fall and consumers would benefit. In the other scenario, the rival would be unable to
achieve any cost reductions and would exit the market, at which point
prices would rise (say, permanently) to the monopoly level. It is clear
that consumers would be better off if the defendant would undertake
the investment in the first scenario where it would lead to lower prices
ex post but would have forgone the investment in the second scenario
where it would lead to higher prices ex post.
Suppose that the firm reasonably could identify the applicable scenario
before making the investment. In this case, the ex ante and ex post
analysis would be identical. If the firm knew (or reasonably should have
known) that the second market scenario would result and it made the
investment, then the conduct would be condemned under the consumer
welfare effect standard. The investment was harmful to consumers.
However, in many cases, at the time the investment is made, the firm
would not be able to identify which scenario actually would occur. It
would be a matter of probabilities. In those cases, the consumer welfare
effect would be evaluated on an ex ante basis, using those reasonable
probabilities. The analysis would involve estimating the likely impact on
prices and consumer welfare. The conduct would be condemned only
if expected consumer harm were found or, stated differently, only if the
likelihood and magnitude of the potential consumer harm (in the second
scenario) outweighed the likelihood and magnitude of the potential
consumer benefits (in the first scenario) .122
See the numerical example infra note 141.
Werden also points out that the no economic sense standard would be evaluated on
the basis of what was reasonably foreseeable at the time that the conduct was undertaken.
Werden, supra note 10, at 416; see also id. at 417 n.16 (noting that in Dentsply, the district
court found that the defendant had undertaken conduct with the mistaken belief that it
would have an exclusionary effect).
122 For an example of this type of analysis in the context of mergers, see Heyer, supra
note 63. This also is similar to the type of ex ante determination undertaken in preliminary
injunction cases. For example, judge Posner suggests that the court should compare "the
120
121
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This same ex an te focus of the consumer harm analysis would be used
even if the case were brought after the fact, that is, after it became known
that the second scenario actually occurred, perhaps as evidenced by the
fact that the rival exited the market and prices rose. It would not make
sense for a court to base liability solely on the actual ex post outcome
if the defendant could not have known ex ante that this outcome was
reasonably likely to occur. Because the goal of antitrust rules is to create
optimal deterrence, the standard must be based on what the firm knew
or should have known at the time that the conduct was undertaken. 123
This ex ante standard has important implications for the evaluation of
false positives and false negatives caused by the different standards. 124

III. EVALUATING THE PROFIT-SACRIFICE AND
CONSUMER WELFARE EFFECT STANDARDS
The fundamental question for antitrust is which standard provides a
more accurate appraisal of the competitive effect of exclusionary conduct. A decision-theoretic approach to legal rules shows that the consumer welfare standard for exclusionary conduct is subject to less error
than the profit-sacrifice standard. And, any potential for "false positives"
from the consumer welfare standard is better resolved by awarding close
cases to the defendant than by making a qualitative change in the legal
standard and requiring the plaintiff to show profit sacrifice.

A. A DECISION-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK FOR
ANTITRUST LIABILITY STANDARDS
Decision theory provides a framework for determining legal standards
by analyzing the cost of legal errors and legal process costs.1 25 For
probability of an erroneous denial weighted by the cost of denial to the plaintiff' with
"the probability of an erroneous grant weighted by the cost of grant to the defendant."
Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986). See also
RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v Philip Morris Inc, 60 F. Supp. 2d 502, 511 (M.D.N.C. 1999).
123 Similarly, if the investment were found to cause likely consumer harm on the basis
of the ex ante analysis, the defendant would not be excused because price did not rise
ex post. Easterbrook and Werden suggest that firms should not be condemned for their
mistakes. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies, supra note 5, at 267 (observing that a failed
attempt at predation "occasions no loss to consumers; a price reduction not leading to
monopoly ... simply benefits consumers by saving them money."); Werden, supra note
10, at 416 ("The test does not condemn conduct undertaken because of an unreasonable
belief that the conduct would have an exclusionary effect."). However, in this case, the
defendant did not make a mistake ex ante, but rather was just unlucky ex post. Of course,
because the conduct failed ex post, such cases might better be pleaded as attempted
monopolization rather than as monopolization.
124 See infra Part III.A.
125 Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rule Making, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257 (1974); C. Frederick Beckner, III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust
Rules, 67 ANTITRUST LJ. 41 (1999); Heyer, supra note 63.
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example, in the context of Section 1 claims, the long-held antitrust bias
is that the likely consumer harm from erroneously permitting a successful
price-fixing conspiracy (i.e., a "false negative") is far greater than the
likely consumer harm from erroneously prohibiting joint price setting
that has no anticompetitive effect (i.e., a "false positive"). This assumption provides a rationale for the per se and quick-look rules that can
eliminate the requirement that plaintiffs prove anticompetitive harm to
consumers.126
Decision-theoretic analysis also can be applied to the determination
of Section 2 standards. 127 This analysis might involve a general Section 2
standard, or different standards for specific categories of conduct. 128 The
Copperweld decision reflects the view that antitrust enforcers generally
should be more skeptical of agreements (particularly agreements among
competitors) than unilateral conduct. l29 Although a fear of false positives
from constraining unilateral conduct (even by a monopolist) was used
by the Court in Trinko as a general rationale for the profit-sacrifice test
for exclusionary conduct, the analysis here suggests that this confidence
in the profit-sacrifice standard over the consumer welfare effect standard
is misplaced. 130
126 For example, this is the basic approach taken in FTC v. Superiur Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). For a general analysis of antitrust short-cut rules in the context
of decision theory, see Beckner & Salop, supra note 125. Decision theory can be used to
rationalize rules of per se legality as well as per se illegality.
127 For the application of the decision-theoretic approach to monopolization law, see
Salop & Romaine, supra note 14; Cass & Hylton, supra note 5; Easterbrook, supra note 5;
Gavil, Dominant Firm Distribution, supra note 34; Heyer, supra note 63.
128 For example, Mark Popofsky suggests how application of various legal tests for monopolization would be appropriate for different types of exclusionary conduct in light of
differences in enforcement costs and the likelihood of false positives and false negatives.
Popofsky, Antitrust Rules, supra note 15.
129 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). Professor
Gavil has suggested that the Capperweld distinction has been weakened over time by the
courts' increased reliance on direct evidence of actual anticompetitive effect. Andrew I.
Gavil, Copperweld 2000: The Vanishing GaP Between Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 68
ANTITRUST LJ. 87, 102-04 (2000).
130 The Trinko Court stated that "the cost of false positives counsels against an undue
expansion of § 2 liability." Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004). The Trinko Court also said that Aspen Skiing is "at or near
the outer boundary of § 2 liability," presumably because of a concern about false positives.
fd. at 399. Aspen Skiing, however, also was at the outer boundary because the defendant's
lawyers erred by failing to appeal the narrow geographic market definition. More importantly, the plaintiff wanted to fix prices with the defendant through the jointly priced
weekly ticket. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 591 n.9
(1985). But the Court apparently could not dispose of the case on these grounds because
Ski Co. dropped the issue. fd. at 598 n.22. The Trinko Court did not even mention this
aspect of the defendant's conduct. Instead, it focused solely on the fact that the defendant
refused to sell daily tickets at the retail price to the plaintiff. That latter conduct is
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In decision-theoretic terms, there are two kinds of erroneous decisions,
ex ante errors and ex post errors. When a decision maker is forced to
make decisions with imperfect information, some ex post errors are
inevitable. The best the decision maker can do is to make the optimal
decision in light of the limited information available. However, where
this is not done, the decision maker commits an ex ante error. Suppose
that the chance of rain is 99 percent and the decision maker chooses
to carry an umbrella. If it turns out not to rain, that decision would be
an ex post error. However, if the decision maker chooses not to carry
an umbrella in this situation, that decision would be an ex ante error,
even if it fortuitously does not rain.
The profit-sacrifice standard allows both types of errors to be made. 131
It permits conduct that causes ex post consumer harms. It also permits
exclusionary conduct that causes ex ante consumer harms, i.e., conduct
that reduces expected consumer welfare, taking into account the probability of benefits and harms. This general result is obvious because the
direct impact on the defendant's profit is not equivalent to the overall
impact of the conduct on consumer welfare, either ex ante or ex post.
In fact, the profit-sacrifice test is not focused at all on the effect of the
conduct on consumers. Rather, it is focused on the defendant's profits
in a hypothetical world. These hypothetical profits are a highly imperfect
(and generally biased) predictor of the impact of the conduct on competition and consumer welfare. 132
B.

COMPARING THE INCIDENCE OF FALSE NEGATIVES
AND FALSE POSITIVES

The previous example of the incompatible design change illustrates
how the profit-sacrifice test can lead to false negatives. Consider the
simple situation discussed where the market outcome is highly predictable at the time that the conduct is undertaken and ex ante and ex post
are identical. In that example, the price increase benchmark for the
profit-sacrifice test would be $5 (i.e., the increase in product performance
which would lead to a constant quality-adjusted price). If the design
farther from the outer boundary because it prevented the plaintiff from competing, not
from colluding.
131 See Vickers, supra note 34, at F255; see also Edlin & Farrell, supra note 21, at 31
("'sacrifice' ... is logically neither necessary nor sufficient for harm to competition. It
could yet be a useful test, but only because of some (still unexplored) empirical correlation,
not as a matter of economic logic."); Elhauge, supra note 34, at 271.
132 The direction of the bias-false positive or false negative-depends on the type of
conduct being evaluated, as discussed in the various examples. In addition, the standard
systematically diverts attention away from the impact of exclusionary conduct on
consumers.
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change costs only $3 per unit, the defendant would not violate the profitsacrifice test. But, if that design change necessarily raises entry barriers
by making competing products incompatible and that inextricably linked
incompatibility would permit the firm to raise its price by $50, then
consumers would be harmed because the quality-adjusted price would
rise. If the profit-sacrifice standard were used, no sacrifice would be
found despite this consumer harm. The result would be a false negative.
Although the profit-sacrifice test is generally more prone to false negatives, it sometimes can lead to false positives and condemn potentially
exclusionary conduct that raises consumer welfare. The pure cost reduction hypothetical discussed earlier provides an example. 133 Consider first
the simple version with perfect information, in which the impact on
exit and price is known with certainty at the time the investment is
undertaken. l34 As discussed in that example, it could well be that the
firm would be able to recover its investment cost in a more efficient
technology only if it were able to gain a monopoly market share and
raise its price. If so, the investment would be condemned under the
profit-sacrifice standard. However, that investment would pass muster
under the consumer welfare effect standard, despite the higher ultimate
prices, if market prices were sufficiently lower during the interim period
before competitors exited from the market and the interim period were
sufficien tly long. 135
133 See supra Part II.D.2.d; see also Elhauge, supra note 34, at 274-79; Marius Schwartz,
Investments in Oligopoly: Welfare Effects and Tests for Predation, 41 OXFORD ECON • PAPERS 698,

701 (1989).
134 That is, it is reasonably foreseeable that the second scenario would result.
135 In yet another example, suppose that a dominant firm undertakes an investment that
reduces its variable costs by $5 per unit. Suppose further that the dominant firm realizes
that its investment can and rapidly would be imitated by rivals, leading them to reduce
their own costs by the same $5. As a result, the dominant firm decides that it cannot
recover the cost of its investment and chooses not to undertake the investment. However,
suppose that the dominant firm instead tweaks the technology slightly so that its investment
breaks an industry standard, which in tum means that competitors can reduce their costs
by only $3 per unit. As a result, the firm finds it necessary to reduce its price only by $3
and, as a result, earns a sufficient return to justifY the investment. This conduct would
escape liability under the consumer welfare test because prices fell. However, it might fail
the profit-sacrifice test. The profit-sacrifice test might assume that the but-for benchmark
involves the standard not being broken and the rivals' costs reduction not being constrained. It might be assumed that the hypothetical market price in this but-for world
would decrease by $5, not $3. At this benchmark price decrease, the dominant firm
investment would not be profitable and so would fail the profit-sacrifice test. If the profitsacrifice standard were implemented in this way, it would generate a false positive. Melamed,
Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11, at 17, criticizes this hypothetical as being unrealistic.
He argues that the defendant also would bear some costs from the broken industry
standard. However, having the defendant also bear a cost would not necessarily render
the conduct unprofitable overall nor cause consumer harm on balance. He also suggests
that the defendant would more likely use its cost advantage to drive the rivals out of
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Some formulations of the profit-sacrifice test for Section 2 also would
create false positives by condemning exclusionary conduct in markets
in which the dominant firm is unable to gain sufficient market power
to raise price. 136 For example, suppose that a firm destroys the counter
displays of one of its rivals and, as a result, profitably increases its market
share. However, suppose that the defendant is unable to increase its
price because of the existence of other competitors. Liability would
not attach to this conduct under the consumer welfare effect standard
because of the lack of any significant impact on price or consumer
welfare. 137 However, some implementations of the profit-sacrifice test
would condemn this conduct.
Proponents of the profit-sacrifice standard might concede these errors
but still favor the profit-sacrifice test. They might argue that false positives
are rare with the profit-sacrifice standard or would be eliminated by
mandating a combined standard under which the plaintiff would be
required to satisfy both the profit-sacrifice standard and the consumer
welfare effect standard. 13s
Profit-sacrifice proponents might not be concerned about false negatives, arguing that the profit-sacrifice test is intended to trump direct
evidence of anticompetitive effect in particular cases because the entire
category of challenged exclusionary conduct ultimately benefits consumers by creating more competition and better products. This criticism
business, a conclusion that implicitly assumes that products are undifferentiated and that
the firms have no capacity constraints. Finally, Melamed suggests that the defendant may
have undertaken the innovation out of fear that someone else would move first, an
assumption that is possible, but certainly is not compelled by any economic logic. For
example, sometimes it is the idea that is original, not the implementation of the idea.
Because ideas may not be patentable, the implementation can be rapidly imitated once
the idea becomes known.
136 For a similar point, see Creighton et aI., supra note 25.
137 These false positives would be eliminated by the combined standard, but that approach
raises the question of whether the profit-sacrifice prong adds any incremental value, in
that it also causes false negatives.
138 Several commentators use the profit-sacrifice test as a test of whether the conduct is
"predatory." They then set out a structural analysis to gauge whether successful recoupment
is likely, though this is not equivalent to a full consumer welfare analysis. See, e.g., Melamed,
Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11, at 11 n.19; Ordover & Willig, Predation, supra note 36,
at 9-13. In a more recent article, Ordover and Willig add a third prong that analyzes the
likelihood and sources of monopoly profits from exclusion. Ordover & Willig, Access and
Bundling, supra note 34, at 109-10. In addition, they also require a showing of harm to
competition. Id. at III n.7. Werden, supra note 10, at 417, states that the no economic
sense test "is applied only after a demonstration that the challenged conduct actually has
some tendency to eliminate or lessen competition." This suggests a two-part test with a type
of anticompetitive market impact prong. However, Werden's use of the classic incipiency
terminology of "tendency to eliminate or lessen competition" suggests a low bar for the
plaintiff on its showing.

HeinOnline -- 73 Antitrust L.J. 347 2005-2006

348

ANTITRUST

LAw JOURNAL

[Vol. 73

essentially makes a distinction between ex ante and ex post effect. The
argument amounts to a claim that while consumers might gain ex post
(i.e., in some cases) from the use of a consumer welfare effect standard,
the use of the consumer welfare effect standard would generally overdeter innovative conduct by dominant firms ex ante (i.e., on average).
According to this view, there also is no way for courts accurately to
balance the ex post and ex ante costs and benefits on a case-by-case
basis. Instead, the profit-sacrifice test must be substituted or added to
stop courts from intervening too often. 139
This criticism of the consumer welfare effect standard seems to assume
erroneously that the effect analysis invariably would be based solely on
(ex post) information that was unavailable at the time that the exclusionary conduct was undertaken, rather than evaluated ex ante. That is not
the case. l40
If the court were to base its decision on the ex post outcome even
when the defendant faced a high degree of uncertainty ex ante, then
there could well be over-deterrence. Investments with a high likelihood
of benefiting consumers, a low likelihood of harming consumers, and
positive expected contribution to consumer welfare would be condemned in those situations when they happened to work out badly for
consumers. As a result, investments with a positive expected contribution
might be deterred, to the detriment of consumers. 141 However, this purely
Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11, at 27.
In the cost-reducing investment example, if the firm could not reasonably have known
at the time that the investment was made whether prices ultimately would rise or fall with
a high degree of certainty, then the consumer welfare effect standard would evaluate the
impact of the conduct on an ex ante basis, using the information available at the time
the conduct was undertaken. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ~ 651b2, at 76;
id. ~ 651d, at 81; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,79 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
141 The general potential for over-deterrence from an ex post evaluation of consumer
welfare can be illustrated with a simple numerical example. Suppose that alleged exclusionary conduct by a dominant firm is predicted ex ante to have a 50% chance of raising
consumer welfare by 2000, if rivals match the firm's expenditures, which leads to prices
falling or remaining the same. But, suppose that the conduct also has a 50% chance of
harming consumers and reducing consumer welfare by 1000 from higher prices, if rivals
are unable to match and instead are forced to reduce their output or exit. Suppose that,
in the event that consumer welfare is raised, the defendant's profits would fall by 10,
whereas if consumer welfare were reduced, the defendant's profits would rise by 100.
Absent antitrust rules, the firm would engage in the conduct because the expected value
of its profits is positive. Suppose, however, that the conduct is evaluated under the consumer
welfare standard on an ex post basis in the event that consumers turn out to be harmed.
Suppose further that in this case, the firm is assessed "single" damages equal to the 1000
reduction in consumer welfare. Under this rule, the firm would be deterred from engaging
in the conduct because its profits would fall by 10 if the conduct benefits consumers and
its profits net of the damages would fall by 900 (i.e., 100 - 1000) if the conduct turns out
to harm consumers. But this would represent over-deterrence because the conduct raises
139

140
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ex post approach would be an improper implementation of the consumer
welfare effect standard when there is a high degree of ex ante uncertainty.
Implementing the consumer welfare effect standard on an ex ante
basis may turn out to cause some ex post false positives or false negatives.
Conduct that predictably leads to expected consumer benefits but unfortunately turns out to harm consumers ex post would not be condemned. 142 Similarly, conduct that predictably leads to expected
consumer harms but fortuitously turns out not to harm consumers ex
post would be condemned. The potential for these ex post errors must
be tolerated for optimal ex ante deterrence when the outcome is
probabilistic.
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that this ex ante
approach does not mean that any small likelihood of consumer benefit
would permit the defendant to escape liability. In many cases, at the
time that the exclusionary conduct is undertaken, the defendant does not
face a significant uncertainty regarding the likely outcome: the consumer
harm often is reasonably foreseeable and, indeed, may be the primary
goal as well as the expected outcome of the exclusionary conduct. In
such cases, the use of ex post analysis would be appropriate and would
not cause false positives. In addition, the legal standard placed on the
plaintiff for proof of consumer harm should not be excessive. In this
regard, the consumer harm might be threatened rather than actually
realized. 143
Critics of the consumer harm standard might argue that even this ex
ante application of the consumer harm standard causes ex ante false
positives and leads to over-deterrence because it is difficult to estimate
the impact on consumer welfare, even on an expected value basis. l44
Under these circumstances, it would be argued, the courts should err
in the direction of false negatives because those errors are less serious.
For example, Professor (now Judge) Frank Easterbrook argues that overthe expected value of consumer welfare by 500. For this reason, the conduct properly
would not be condemned in a ex ante evaluation. Note that this over-deterrence would
not be mitigated by use of injunctive relief instead of damages. If the defendant is denied
the opportunity to increase its profits, it will not institute the conduct. Incidentally, note
that this conduct also would violate some versions of the profit-sacrifice test. Although
the firm's expectation is that profits will rise (because the expected value of profits rises
by 45), the conduct would be unprofitable absent the consumer harm from the higher
prices in the event that rivals are unable to match. Because the expected value of consumer
welfare rises, the profit-sacrifice standard would lead to over-deterrence, that is, a false
positive.
142 [d.
143
144

3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, '\I 651d, at 80.
Melamed, UnifYing Principles, supra note 11, at 380-81.
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deterrence (resulting from false positives) is more serious than underdeterrence (resulting from false negatives) because over-deterrence can
slow innovation whereas false negatives will be self-corrected by market entry.145
However, this reasoning is inapplicable to modern antitrust enforcement. Because entry can eliminate the harms from anticompetitive conduct, or even deter it, ease of entry routinely is taken into account
in determining liability for monopolization. When entry is easy, the
defendant properly would escape Section 2 liability under the consumer
harm standard. Thus, there would be no false positives because there
would be no liability.
In contrast, if the liability standard itself is relaxed, the outcome will
be harmful when there are entry barriers; the result will be a durable
monopoly. When there are high entry barriers, a destroyed entrant likely
cannot be resurrected or replaced. Thus, this analysis of entry barriers
suggests that the profit-sacrifice standard leads to under-deterrence, not
that the consumer harm standard leads to over-deterrence.
As for innovation, anticompetitive exclusion likely would reduce innovation in dynamic markets by eliminating rivals that would innovate and
by decreasing competitive pressure that would force the monopolist to
innovate. In fact, there is perhaps a greater irony in relying on Judge
Easterbrook's advice. The entrant that is being destroyed, in fact, may
be the very innovative firm trying to serve as the self-correcting market
response to entry. Allowing exclusionary conduct reduces, or even eliminates, the ability of the market to self-correct.l46 Moreover, there is no
evidence that dominant firms' innovations have been deterred by the
fear of antitrust. 147

Judge Easterbrook also argues that false positives can set judicial precedents that will not be undone. While that may have been true forty years
ago, there have been major shifts in key antitrust precedents since then.
There is no reason to think that plaintiff verdicts create stronger prece145 Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 3 (1984) [hereinafter
Limits of Antitrust]. For a recent criticism of the view that markets are self-correcting, see
David McGowan, Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs and United States v. Microsoft,
20 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1185 (2005).
146 Steven C. Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the
Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 187, 197-98 (2000) [hereinafter First Principles]. See also
Gavil, Dominant Firm Distribution, supra note 34, at 37-38. Deterrence in this area also is
reduced by the courts' unwillingness to use a strong remedy for the destruction of nascent
competitors. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
147 Jonathan Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. EcoN. PERSP., Fall 2003, at
27,41 [hereinafter Antitrust Enforcement].
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dents than do defense verdicts, either today or in the last twenty-five
years since the use of per se rules outside of naked price fixing has
declined. l48 And, broad precedents are unlikely in a case-by-case rule of
reason analysis under Section 2.
A different type of criticism involves judicial competence. Some antitrust experts argue that implementing the consumer welfare effect standard is beyond the competence ofjudges and juries. 149 Judge Easterbrook
also argues that courts cannot rely on economics because economists
take a long time to decide and do not agree. 150 These criticisms seem
extreme and unreliable. The rule of reason has been used in Section 1
and Section 7 cases, so it is not clear why Section 2 would be so much
harder. 151
It certainly is ironic to hear now from Judge Easterbrook that economics is not useful. After all, the shock and dismay at the view expressed
in Topco that courts should not "ramble through the wilds of economic
theory" became a cause celebre for transforming antitrust standards from
per se illegality to the rule of reason. 152 Government agencies, courts, and
juries also are asked to conceptualize and (if necessary) make quantitative
comparisons in evaluating the costs and benefits of government programs, negligence under the classic Carroll Towing formula,153 whether
a product design is defective,IM whether a preliminary i~unction should
be granted,155 and whether an agency is providing sufficient due
process. 156
Moreover, that same judicial competence argument would apply just
as strongly to the implementation of the profit-sacrifice test, which
148 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985); jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,45 (1984); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Contintental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977).
149 See, e.g., Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 145, at 29.
150 [d. at 11.
151 For example, Baumol et al. suggest that a consumer welfare effect standard is the
right criterion to use to evaluate false advertising claims with complicated market effects
of the sort that would arise in an antitrust case. See William Baumol et aI., Brief of Amici
Curiae Economics Professors to U.S. Supreme Court at 8, Verizon Communications Inc.
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (authored by four economics
scholars: William]. Baumol,janusz A. Ordover, Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, and Robert
D. Willig).
152 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 n.l0 (1972); see also supra note 2,
at 274-78.
153 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
154 Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co. 573 P.2d 443 (1978).
155 Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prod. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986).
156 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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requires a court to evaluate profitability in an unrealistic, hypothetical
world. And, as discussed below, implementing the profit-sacrifice test is
fraught with other pitfalls. 157
Similarly, it is argued that the consumer welfare effect standard for
exclusionary conduct would lead to firms facing too much uncertainty
because it is so difficult to know whether conduct is anticompetitive. 158
This claim ignores the fact that the consumer welfare effect test would
be evaluated on the basis of the information reasonably available to the
firm at the time that the conduct was undertaken, just as would be true
for the profit-sacrifice test. The profit-sacrifice test is not any easier for
firms to administer, as illustrated by several of the examples presented
earlier. The profit-sacrifice test (and the no economic sense variation)
involve analysis of outcomes in a hypothetical world in which real-world
market forces are assumed to be inoperative.
For all these reasons, the consumer welfare effect standard is unlikely
to lead to excessive false positives when it is used to evaluate exclusionary
conduct. It also is not true that the profit-sacrifice standard would eliminate false positives or would maintain a low level of false negatives. Nor
is it clear why false positives are more costly or more difficult to reverse
than false negatives in the current legal environment. Thus, in terms of
optimal deterrence, there is no evidence supporting the view that the
consumer welfare effect standard would lead to over-deterrence, nor
that the profit-sacrifice standard would avoid under-deterrence. There
is no convincing empirical evidence to suggest that the profit-sacrifice
test reaches the optimal outcome, or even pushes in the right direction,
in the current legal environment. 159
157
158

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.D.

159 Empirical work to estimate the optimal standard would be very difficult. It is well
known that the selection of cases that go to litigation is not a random sample of disputes,
and the sample of cases that reach the Supreme Court is quite small, as well as nonrandom. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). Econometrics, in principle, could be useful in demonstrating
the superiority or inferiority of per se illegality versus per se legality. But it is far less likely
to be useful in comparing the relative efficacy of alternative rule of reason standards. For
example, suppose that an econometric study would find that the "average" vertical merger
is procompetitive and leads to lower prices, as discussed in James C. Cooper et aI., Vertical
Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference (Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper
No. 05-12, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=699601. Such a rigorous study
would be useful for arguing that vertical mergers should not be per se illegal. But, that study
would not establish that all (or even that, say, 80% of) vertical mergers are procompetitive.
Antitrust enforcement is designed to identify, enjoin, and deter only those few vertical
mergers that are shown by the evidence to be anticompetitive. Thus, the results of a broadbased empirical study are not very useful for guiding case-by-case enforcement. Nor would
these results be useful in choosing between the consumer welfare effect and profit-sacrifice
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Finally, if over-deterrence still is viewed as a concern, there are better
ways of tipping the scales to avoid false positives. In particular, it would
be better to adjust the plaintiff's standard of proof under the consumer
welfare effect standard. However this adjustment is phrased by the courts,
the amount of harm that would be needed for the plaintiff to prevail
can be increased. For example, the consumer harm threshold, in principle, can be set at either actual or threatened harm. Similarly, the required
standard of proof can be set at plausibility, tendency, substantially threatened, significant likelihood, and so on, up to virtual certainty of significant harm. The consumer welfare effect standard can be adjusted at
the margin along this continuum to accommodate concerns about the
relative costs of false positives and false negatives. This corresponds to
the weighting of the evidence according to a sliding scale. l60
On the one hand, if there is a greater concern with false positives,
courts could be generally more skeptical of the plaintiff's allegations
and evidence, both for summary judgment and in the merits determination. This would mean that defendants would prevail in close cases. (In
fact, this may already be the case. 161 ) If an even greater adjustment were
desired, the test could be phrased in the way Areeda and Hovenkamp
put it, "harms disproportionate to the resulting benefits." 162 On the other
hand, if there is a greater concern with false negatives, on the grounds
that monopoly tends to be durable in markets with high entry barriers
standards. For a similar view, see Michael H. Riordan, Competitive Effects of Vertical
Integration (2005) (unpublished manuscript). For a review of the large number of empirical studies of antitrust enforcement, see Jonathan Baker, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note
147. For criticisms of the FTC study, see William Coman or et aI., Vertical Antitrust Policy
as a Problem of Inference: The Response of the American Antitrust Institute (AAI Working Paper
No. 05-04, Apr. 2005), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/ 408.pdf. For
further back-and-forth between the FTC and AAI authors, see the links at http://www.anti
trustinstitute.org/recent2/413.cfm.
160 See Salop & Romaine, supra note 14.
161 The "preponderance of the evidence" standard is often expressed as requiring the
plaintiff to show that the harm is more likely than not (i.e., 51 % likelihood). However,
surveys of judges suggest that the required likelihood is larger than this for many judges.
See C.MA McCauliff, Burdens of Proof Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional
Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1293, 1330-32 (1982); see also Rita James Simon, Judges'
Translations of Burden of Proof into Statements of Probability, 13 TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 103,
112 (1969).
162 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ~ 651a, at 72. In evidentiary terms, the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof alternatively could be replaced by an
even more disproportionate test like "clear showing" or something in between these two
standards. For example, the FTC has recently suggested a move in the other directionthat the burden placed on firms attempting to overturn the presumption of patent validity
should be reduced from a standard of clear and convincing evidence to preponderance
of the evidence. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAw AND POLICY 8 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2003/10/cpreport.htm.
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or because monopolists have ample opportunities to destroy nascent
competitors without facing risk of a significant remedy, then the standard
of proof facing the plaintiff could be relaxed accordingly.
These various types of marginal quantitative adjustments make more
economic sense than changing the liability standard in a qualitative way
by adopting a standard, such as the profit-sacrifice test, that does not
relate directly to the effect on consumer welfare. It is better to adjust
the standard of proof than to make a wholesale change to the liability
test that is not calibrated to the relative costs of the two types of judicial
errors. When a qualitative change in the liability standard is adopted,
there is no way of knowing whether the adjustment is the proper size.
Simply grasping for a more defendant-friendly standard is just a shot in
the dark.
An explicit marginal or incremental adjustment to the basic anticompetitive effect standard also is more transparent than a qualitative change
in standard. Such transparency is necessary to ensure that antitrust law
remains coherent. Doctrinal incoherence is always a risk when adjustments are made by adopting different qualitative standards. Litigants
are left to argue by analogy over characterization (e.g., are loyalty payments more like alleged predatory pricing or more like attempts to
induce exclusive dealing or more like tying), rather than arguing over
the fundamental economic issue-the likely effect of the conduct on
competition and consumers. It is hard to see how the goals of antitrust
law are served by promoting analogy over analysis in this way.

C.

ANTI COMPETITIVE PURPOSE AND INTENT

It might be argued that the plaintiff should be required to prove
both profit sacrifice and consumer welfare harm. This type of combined
standard could be claimed to flow from the concept of anticompetitive
purpose and intent. For example, the combined standard could be said
to follow from the classic Grinnell standard, which involves the "willful"
acquisition of monopoly,163 although in Griffith, the Supreme Court said
that specific intent is not required for monopolization. l64 Colgate also
raises the issue of anti competitive purpose separate from anticompetitive
effect. 165 In the combined standard, the profit-sacrifice standard would
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,570-71 (1966).
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, lO5 (1948).
165 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,307 (1919). Interestingly, in quoting
Colgate, the Trinko Court dropped the "in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain
a monopoly" proviso. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) ("Thus, as a general matter, the Sherman Act 'does not
restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely
163

164
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be treated as one source of evidence of anticompetitive purpose or the
sole permissible evidence. The consumer welfare effect standard then
would be used to determine whether there was an anticompetitive effect
from the conduct.
The role of anticompetitive intent in exclusionary conduct cases has
been subject to substantial criticism. Areeda and Hovenkamp say that
most discussion of "'purpose or intent' is largely diversionary or redundant."I66 They do agree, however, that "knowledge of intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences," that is, to
evaluate whether there is anticompetitive effect. 167 In fact, for ambiguous
conduct, they suggest that "considerations of subjective intent are sometimes essential."l68
Similarly, the Microsoft court emphasized that the key antitrust issue
is competitive effect, though that may give a role to intent, stating: "[ 0] ur
focus is upon the effect of that conduct, not upon the intent behind it.
Evidence of the intent behind the conduct is relevant only to the extent
that it helps us understand the likely effect of the monopolist's
conduct." 169
If a firm's exclusionary conduct would be unprofitable absent an anticompetitive impact on price and output, then that profit sacrifice would
imply that a profit-maximizing firm would not have undertaken the
conduct absent the anticompetitive effect because it would make no
rational economic sense for a profit-maximizing firm.170 However, there
also are other ways to determine anticompetitive purpose. First, anticompetitive purpose could be inferred from anticompetitive effect, following
Judge Hand's view that "no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of
what he is doing."171 This approach would dispense with the need for
private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom
he will deal.'" (quoting Colgate, 250 u.s. at 307».
166 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ~ 651, at 75.
167 Id. at 74 (quoting Chicago Board of Trade v. United States 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918».
168 Id. ~ 651 b2, at 76. For another recent discussion of the role of intent evidence, see
Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role Icrr Intent Evidence in Monopolization Analysis, 54 AM. U. L.
REv. 151 (2004)
169 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
170 In the context of predatory innovation (like the design change hypothetical in this
article), Ordover and Willig state that profit-sacrifice shows that the innovation is "motivated
solely by the monopoly attendant on the exit that they induce.» Ordover & Willig, Predation,
supra note 36, at 8. Werden eschews an anticompetitive purpose interpretation of the no
economic sense formulation. Werden, supra note 10, at 416-17, 417 n.15, 426.
171 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (1945). Werden makes a
similar point. "Burning down a rival's factory is exclusionary conduct even if the defendant
is a pyromaniac and never considers the economic benefits of the conduct." Werden,
supra note 10, at 417.
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separate evidence. Second, anticompetitive purpose could be determined through testimony and documents. 172
Moreover, conduct that does not involve profit sacrifice nonetheless
may involve anticompetitive purpose and may cause anticompetitive
effect. It is not possible to reject a claim of anticompetitive purpose in
the absence of profit sacrifice for a simple reason: exclusionary conduct
may have multiple motives rather than a single purpose. I73
Werden eschews any interest in subjective motivation. But a complexity
similar to multiple motives arises in his test when the conduct generates
"legitimate" profits as well as "profits from eliminating competition."
Werden suggests that the no economic sense determination may not be
feasible in this situation. 174
When there are multiple motives, the profit-sacrifice test tends to
ascribe the conduct to the procompetitive motive. In essence, the profitsacrifice test implicitly takes the approach that a defendant only can be
said to be motivated by an anticompetitive purpose if the conduct would
have been unprofitable (and thus not undertaken) in the absence of
the claimed anticompetitive benefits to the firm. However, this view is
not compelled by logic or economic theory.175 The anticompetitive effect
of the conduct may have provided a sufficient incentive to carry out the
conduct even absent any efficiency benefits. Applying this same logic
symmetrically, it would be equally true to say that a defendant only could
be said to be motivated by a procompetitive purpose if the conduct would
have been unprofitable (and thus not undertaken) in the absence of
the claimed efficiency benefits.
Requiring that the plaintiff prove that the sole purpose of the conduct
is anticompetitive would lead to significant false negatives, as pointed
172 In Baumol et aI., supra note 151, at 24, Ordover and Willig and their co-authors
recognize that there can be "direct objective evidence of willfulness, quite apart of profit
sacrifice." They argue that this evidence should be used, but apparently only where the
exclusionary conduct violates an extrinsic standard.
173 It surely is fallacious to assume that all anticompetitive economic conduct is driven
simply by strict profit maximization. Humans are motivated by emotions in addition to
greed. Vanity, envy, hate, disdain, and spite also may motivate anticompetitive conduct,
and the market for corporate control is not a perfect constraint on such non-profitmaximizing conduct. In Werden's view, the defendant's psychological state is irrelevant.
He would look to the "objective economic considerations for a reasonable person, and
not the state of mind of any particular decision maker." Werden, supra note 10, at 416.
174 Werden, supra note 10, at 420-2l.
175 The profit-sacrifice standard does not go as far as immunizing all conduct with any
non-zero efficiency benefits, as illustrated by the case of cost-reducing investments discussed
earlier, in Part II.D.2.d.
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out by Judge Hand in Alcoa. I76 Moreover, this pro-defendant approach
to anticompetitive purpose is not the only possible way to deal with the
concept. For example, in Aspen Skiing, the jury was instructed to determine whether the defendant's policies and business arrangements "were
designed primarily to further any domination of the market or submarket." 177 The Court affirmed this instruction in the con text of analyzing
the likely impact of the conduct on competition and consumer welfare.
Of course, in that case, the Court also concluded that certain aspects of
the defendant's conduct indicated profit sacrifice.
This analysis of anticompetitive purpose also is related to the issue of
so-called costless or cheap exclusion that might not violate the profitsacrifice test. The usual examples are fraud on the Patent Office, sham
litigation, and bad-faith administrative filings. I78 For example, it is doubtful that Unocal increased its own costs by failing to disclose its patent
application to the regulators in California. I79 Similarly, it does not seem
very costly for a monopolist to make threats or include deceptive statements in its advertising. Exclusionary conduct that affects customers'
expectations of the viability of the rivals also could be virtually "costless" exclusion. ISO
IV. PITFALLS IN THE PROFIT-SACRIFICE STANDARD
In a recent article, Professor Mark Patterson concludes that the profitsacrifice test permits an "objective assessment" of the monopolist's
176 In Alcoa, Judge Hand rejected the "sole purpose" version of the profit·sacrifice standard, stating that, "Only in case we interpret 'exclusion' as limited to maneuvers not
honestly industrial, but actuated solely by a desire to prevent competition, can such a
course indefatigably pursued, be deemed not 'exclusionary.'" In Judge Hand's view, this
standard would fail to protect competition, but rather "would in our judgment emasculate
the Act; would permit just such consolidations as it was designed to prevent." United States
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431(2d Cir. 1945).
177 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597 (1985) (emphasis added).
178 Brief for the United States, supra note 8, at n.2.
179 Union Oil Co. of Cal., FTC Docket No. 9305 (July 6, 2004), available at 2004 WL
1632816; see also Creighton et aI., supra note 25.
180 A slight variation of the allegations in Lorain Journal illustrates this point. Lorain
Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). Suppose that a monopolist newspaper
is facing a new entrant in the advertising market and the newspaper announces that it
will charge a price above the monopoly level if advertisers do not advertise exclusively in
the newspaper. In light of this exclusivity policy, many (if not all) advertisers may choose
to forgo buying advertising from the entrant, even if the entrant offers a large enough
discount to offset the newspaper's "tax" on non-exclusivity and even if they think that
successful entry would force the newspaper to abandon the exclusivity policy. This is
because many (if not all) customers might fear that other advertisers would choose not
to buy from the entrant, causing the entrant to fail to achieve minimum viable scale and
thus be forced to exit from the market. For further analysis, see Eric B. Rasmusen et aI.,
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conduct, in contrast to other monopolization tests that "require hypothetical reconstructions of the market in the absence of the monopolist'S
challenged conduct or difficult causation inquiries."181 This analysis is
flawed. Proper implementation of the profit-sacrifice standard is complex
and would lead to subjectivity in practice precisely because the profitsacrifice test requires the court to determine the outcome in a hypothetical market. The hypothetical market of the profit-sacrifice test is not
simply the actual market before the challenged conduct was initiated.
The outcome in this hypothetical market also is not the same as the
outcome in the real-world market absent the challenged conduct.
Instead, the profit-sacrifice standard requires an assessment of the defendant's likely conduct in the hypothetical absence of an ability to raise
prices. In contrast, the consumer welfare effect standard looks to the
effect of the conduct on the market outcome in the actual market or in
a hypothetical (but normally functioning) market absent the conduct.
The profit-sacrifice test is an unreliable legal standard because it is
difficult to implement properly. Specific problems arise in several ways:
analyzing situations where recoupment and predatory periods are simultaneous, choosing the correct benchmark price and quantity, and gathering adequate information to use the profit-sacrifice test. These pitfalls
can cause either false negatives or false positives. 182
A.

SIMULTANEOUS RECOUPMENT AND THE MEASUREMENT OF PROFIT

In a successful predatory pricing scenario there typically are two distinct phases, the "predatory" period in which the firm reduces price
(and, in doing so, sacrifices profits) and the "recoupment" period in
which the firm increases price and market share, more than offsetting
the profit sacrifice. 183 However, in RRC exclusionary conduct cases, such
as purchases of exclusionary rights from input suppliers and refusals to
deal, there often are not two distinct periods. Recoupment in the form
of higher prices and market share can occur simultaneously with the
exclusionary conduct. 184 If there is no distinct period in which temporal
profit sacrifice can be identified, use of the profit-sacrifice test could
Naked Exclusion, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 1137 (1991); llya Segal & Michael Whinston, Naked
Exclusion: Comment, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 296 (2000); see also Salop & Romaine, supra note
14; Elhauge, supra note 34.
181 Patterson, supra note 34, at 37, 43.
182 Some of these pitfalls do not apply to the no economic sense formulation.
183 See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209
(1993). A type of simultaneous recoupment actually was alleged in Brooke Group. For a
critical discussion of those claims, see Elzinga & Mills, supra note 62, at 569-70, 575-76.
184 See Salop & Scheffman, supra note 22, at 267; Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 22,
at 224; see also Elhauge, supra note 34, at 282-92.
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lead to false negatives by failing to identify significant competitive injury.
In contrast, the consumer welfare effect test would account for simultaneity by evaluating the impact on prices and consumer welfare in every
period.
This simultaneity represents a pitfall for the profit-sacrifice standard
but one that can be corrected because there is a conceptual profit sacrifice
even if there is no temporal profit sacrifice. The direct eJfect of the exclusionary conduct can involve profit sacrifice, meaning that the language of
profit sacrifice still can be used to describe the conduct. In principle,
an analyst or a court could find other evidence to substitute for the
temporal comparison of profits. I85 And, in fact, the no economic sense
variation avoids this pitfall. I86
B. MONOPOLY MAINTENANCE AND THE BENCHMARK PRICE

In monopoly maintenance cases, the dominant firm does not use
exclusionary conduct literally to raise its profits. Instead, it maintains its
profits at the supracompetitive level and avoids profit reductions, for
example, by preventing price competition. As a result, successful exclusionary conduct would not be accompanied by any temporal increase in
overall profits nor any temporal increase in price. This fact alone could
lead a court to the erroneous conclusion that the firm has not engaged
in profit sacrifice, thus running the risk of significant false negatives or
under-deterrence.
Monopoly maintenance cases also involve a knotty problem of selecting
the but-for price benchmark for implementing the profit-sacrifice test.
This is because the proper benchmark is not the current price, which
is set at the monopoly level and generates the monopoly profits that the
monopolist is trying to protect. This is a variant of the classic Cellophane
Fallacy error made by the Court in du Pont,I87 probably the most well185 For example, in Aspen Skiing, the Court looked to Ski Co.'s conduct in other markets
where it apparently lacked any purpose to destroy competition. The Court also reasoned
from first principles that the failure to sell daily tickets to Highlands at its standard retail
price represented a clear profit sacrifice. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603-04, 603 n.30 (1985). However, as discussed below, this analysis
potentially ignores the higher profits that the defendant would have made in additional
weekly tickets at the non-exclusionary price, or it characterizes those profits as anticompetitive as a matter of assumption.
186 Werden, supra note 10, at 424-25. The no economic sense variation avoids this pitfall
because it does not focus on the profit chronology.
187 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S 377 (1956). For the classic
statement of the Cellophane Fallacy, see Donald Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane
Case, 70 HARv. L. REv. 281 (1956). See also Salop, First Principles, supra note 146, at 196;
Elhauge, supra note 34, at 286.
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known example of a false negative. The proper competitive benchmark
for the profit-sacrifice test is the market price that would occur absent
the alleged exclusionary conduct.
This benchmark error is illustrated by extending the previous example
of inducing refusals to deal by input suppliers. When the conduct was
used to achieve monopoly power, there was profit sacrifice. 188 Transforming this case into the context of monopoly maintenance results in a
finding of no profit sacrifice if the initial monopoly price is set as the
benchmark. For example, suppose that a firm initially is a monopolist
selling 600 units at a price of $100 when it faces a threat of new entry.
The firm anticipates that successful entry would cause the price to fall
to a more competitive level of $60 and reduce its sales volume down to
500 units. The firm also realizes that it is able to prevent this entry by
paying $3000 to the suppliers of a critical input to refuse to deal with
the entrant.
In this example, if profit sacrifice is calculated by using the $60, postentry price as the price benchmark, then profit sacrifice would be found.
This is the correct answer. The $60 price is the proper benchmark
because the market price would be $60 absent the exclusionary conduct. 189 However, a court could err and instead use the $100 monopoly
price as the benchmark.

Such "grandfathering" of the monopoly profits mistakenly equates
legitimately achieved monopoly power with permission to engage in
anticompetitive exclusionary conduct to maintain the monopoly. The
fact that the firm achieved the monopoly through superior skill, foresight,
and industry does not give the firm a right to maintain that monopoly
by exclusionary conduct in the face of entry. But, applying the profitsacrifice test with the monopoly price as the benchmark would do just
that. As a result, the profit-sacrifice test can yield a false negative.
This error would be less likely under the no economic sense version
of the test in which the benchmark is intended to be the no-exclusion
price, not the current monopoly price. However, even with that formulation, a court could erroneously evaluate the economic rationality of the
conduct at current prices, without respect to the potential downward
price impact of forgoing the conduct.
See supra Part II.B.l.
Melamed seems to agree with this analysis. Melamed, UnifYing Principles, supra note
11, at 399 ("sacrifice test requires determination of what the price would have been if
rivals' costs had not been increased").
188

189
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These errors in the monopoly maintenance case would not be made
with the consumer welfare effect standard because it focuses on identifying the market price that would occur in the market absent the alleged
anticompetitive conduct. If that price is lower than the current price,
then the anticompetitive nature of the conduct would be seen. If the
conduct also led to a product improvement or induced beneficial services, those consumer benefits could be compared to the price effect to
evaluate the net impact on the quality-adjusted price.
C. THE COMPLEXITY OF DEFINING THE BENCHMARK OUTPUT

The choice of the benchmark output for the profit-sacrifice standard
also is subject to controversy. The defendant's benchmark output could
be assumed to remain constant at the pre-exclusion level. Or, the benchmark output could be the output that the defendant would sell after the
RRC conduct but assuming that the market prices did not change and
the disadvantaged rivals remained viable.
The general definition of the standard does not resolve this controversy. As stated by Werden, "Applying the no economic sense test also
may require sorting the profit gains from challenged conduct into a
component attributable to legitimate competition on the merits and
a component attributable to the elimination of competition."I90 This
methodology requires the analyst to specify the meaning of "elimination
of competition" and whether that includes conduct that harms competitors but not competition (i.e., consumers). Thus, if the conduct does
not permit the defendant to raise (or maintain) price, but does permit
it to take output from a competitor, should that additional output be
counted as legitimate or not?
For example, consider RRC conduct in which a firm pays input suppliers to refuse to deal with a competitor selling a differentiated product
in a market with prohibitive entry barriers facing others. Suppose that
this conduct raises the disadvantaged competitor's marginal costs. This
exclusionary conduct would permit the defendant to raise price, which
would harm consumers, assuming that the conduct does not significantly
eliminate free riding or contribute significantly to efficiency in some way.
Suppose that the profit-sacrifice standard were to specify a benchmark
in which the victim's costs are raised, but the hypothetical market price
remains constant at the pre-exclusion level and the defendant's output is
190

Werden, supra note 10, at 420-21. See also supra text accompanying note 174.
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assumed to remain constant. 191 Under this benchmark, the RRC conduct
would violate the test. However, if the benchmark output is assumed to
be the output level of the defendant after the RRC conduct, but at the
benchmark price and assuming that the entrant remains viable, then
this output would be higher and the RRC conduct may not be found to
involve profit-sacrifice. 192
This divergence in outcome also is not correlated with whether or not
there is consumer harm. If the defendant gains no power to raise price,
for example, because there is sufficient competition from other nonexcluded competitors, the conduct can still fail the profit-sacrifice test
when output is held constant. 193 Modest efficiency benefits (e.g., cost
savings) from the conduct would not necessarily change these results. 194
191 Werden adopts this benchmark when it is found that "the defendant diverted the
sales by directly impeding the ability of rivals to make those sales." [d. at 421. Werden
views this situation as a rare case.
192 The product design hypothetical also can illustrate this point. The profit-sacrifice
test would assume that the quality-adjusted price remains constant. At that higher price,
the firm might increase its profits by increasing its output and market share. Thus, even
if the cost of the design change exceeds the increase in product value, the firm's profits
still might rise. As a result, its conduct might not violate the profit-sacrifice test even
though the unit cost of the design change exceeds its per unit incremental value. For
example, suppose that the cost of the new higher-quality product is $6 per unit and the
consumer value of the product improvement (and the benchmark price increase for the
profit-sacrifice test) is $5. However, even when the price rises by $5, suppose that the
dominant firm is able to increase its sales volume from 100 to 140 units because rivals are
disadvantaged. If the monopolist's initial profit margin were $10 and that margin fell to
$9 after the design change, the additional 40 units would increase the firm's profits by
$360 (i.e., $9 x 40 units). This would more than offset the $100 decrease in profits from
the $1 margin reduction on the 100 initial units, so the firm's profits would rise on balance
by $260 (i.e., $360 - $100), not fall by $100. This is a case in which the conduct generates
both "legitimate" and anticompetitive profits, so it is not clear that Werden would view
the no economic sense test as "feasible." Werden, supra note 10, at 420-21.
19S In this case, there is raising rivals' costs but no increased market power. Under the
two-step market power harm analysis set out in Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 22, this
conduct would not violate the antitrust laws. The only consumer harm would be the small
reduction in variety or perhaps an insignificant price increase. The usual focus of consumer
injury in antitrust is the harm from higher prices, not simply the reduction in choice. If
reduction in choice were sufficient without more to support an antitrust violation, then
a horizontal merger of differentiated product suppliers would be anticompetitive if a
single brand were eliminated. Closing a supermarket that is convenient to a nearby apartment building would be sufficient for a finding a liability in a supermarket merger. Vertical
mergers similarly would be more prone to challenge. See generally Riordan & Salop, supra
note 104.
194 For example, consider a firm's investment in a variable cost reduction. Holding the
benchmark price constant at the level before the cost reduction, suppose that the firm
cannot recover its investment costs without increasing its output at the expense of its
competitors. On the one hand, if the profit-sacrifice test treats the benchmark output as
fixed at the pre-exclusion level, then this cost-reducing conduct would be condemned by
the profit-sacrifice test. On the other hand, the conduct would not be condemned if the
profits on the defendant's increased output are counted as legitimate.
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Alternatively, if the conduct would lead to higher prices in the real world,
the conduct could pass the profit-sacrifice test when the benchmark
output is set at the higher level, even if there are no efficiency benefits
and the exclusion is costly to the defendant. Thus, whichever output
benchmark is chosen will lead to problematic results in some cases. 195
Of course, choosing the output benchmark on the basis of an extrinsic
conclusion of whether or not the conduct is considered "competition
on the merits" is circular, as discussed previously.196 It is the role of the
standard to define competition on the merits, not the other way around.
The choice of assumption for the benchmark output also would create
a controversy between the opposing economic experts and would add
another level of complexity into the profit-sacrifice test. If these disagreements could be resolved, this source of subjectivity would be eliminated,
but resolution is unlikely. This is because the profit-sacrifice standard
has a number of alternative formulations and exclusionary conduct is
diverse, which makes resolution a long and arduous process. Rather than
embark on this process and the likely errors attendant to it, a better
approach would be to adopt the consumer welfare effect standard.
D. INFORMATION BURDENS ON THE DEFENDANT

The consumer welfare effect standard is sometimes criticized for creating uncertainty for firms that do not know whether their conduct is
permissible. In a recent article, Melamed argues that antitrust law "needs
to temper its enthusiasm for theoretical precision with an appropriate
accommodation for the practical limitations upon firms that must comply
with the law."197 He suggests that the profit-sacrifice test is easier for
firms to implement in the business planning process than is the consumer
welfare effect standard. 198
This uncertainty is greatly exaggerated. Most cases involve either conduct that excludes and lacks any legitimate business justification (leading
to unvarnished consumer harm) or conduct that only minimally impairs
rivals and has substantial efficiencyjustifications (leading to no consumer
195 Ordover and Willig analyze only conduct that causes rivals to exit. For that conduct,
they assume that the rival remains able to produce without incurring new start-up costs.
Ordover & Willig, Predation, supra note 36, at 13. This formulation does not make it clear
what they would assume about RRC conduct that does not cause exit. Werden's price
benchmark is set "absent a tendency to eliminate competition." Werden, supra note 10,
at 433. His output assumption is not stated explicitly. See also Patterson, supra note 34.
196 See Elhauge, supra note 34, at 272, 293. Werden, supra note 10, at 418 & nn.21-25
(prudential safe harbors).
197 Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11, at 7.

1981d.
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harm). The truly hard cases are only a small subset. And, there will be
hard cases for any legal standard because some firms have the corporate
DNA or the incentive to skate close to the line, wherever the line is. 199
At the same time, the subjectivity and unresolved issues in implementing
the profit-sacrifice standard indicates that it is not simpler for firms to
understand and use.
These issues can be illustrated with the examples discussed earlier.
Suppose that a firm is contemplating an incompatible design change.
According to Melamed, with the profit-sacrifice test, the company can
evaluate a simple question that occurs naturally in its business planning:
will the design change either save it operating expenses that are less
than the cost of the change or generate incremental revenues (Le., in
excess of revenues in the but-for world) that exceed the cost of the
change? If so, Melamed argues, and if the defendant had a reasonable
contemporaneous basis for thinking so, then the design change entails
no profit-sacrifice. In contrast, the consumer welfare effect standard
requires the company to ask how the design change affects the welfare
of its customers and whether the design change affects rivals' costs.
According to Melamed, this latter set of questions is more difficult for
the firm to answer.
A closer examination reveals that the profit-sacrifice test is not easier
for the firm to implement for this conduct. To carry out the profitsacrifice test, it is not enough to evaluate the incremental cost and
revenue of the design change. The firm also must be able to predict the
outcome of the design change in a hypothetical, butjor world in which the
design change does not affect the competitiveness of rivals. Making such
an assumption and analyzing market outcomes under this assumption
are not part of normal business planning. Business planning does not
focus on hypothetical markets invented by antitrust practitioners and
courts in which firms hypothetically lack the ability to raise prices, when
in fact the firms do have such power in the real world. Nor does business
planning focus on hypothetical markets in which competitors act in
economically irrational ways by failing to reduce their output when their
costs are increased.
For example, consider the design change conduct discussed earlier
in which the design change increases the value of a dominant firm's
product by $5 per unit by improving the functionality of the product,
but inextricably also makes competitors' products incompatible with the
dominant firm's. Suppose that the dominant firm's marketing depart199

Priest & Klein, supra note 159.
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ment predicts that, as a result of barriers to competition created by
incompatibility of the dominant firm's new product with competitors'
products, the profit-maximizing strategy would be to raise its price by
$50, while selling the same quantity of the product. Suppose that the
dominant firm makes the design change, raises price by $50, and then
is sued for monopolization.
On these facts, there is no reason why the dominant firm's managers
would have been unable to make the relevant real-world price/quality
comparison for the consumer welfare effect standard at the time of the
design change. In addition to knowing the size of the likely real-world
price increase, the firm only needs to know whether its quality-adjusted
price will increase or decrease. Moreover, this also is information that
the firm would need to know to maximize its real-world profits. This is
not a situation where the consumer welfare effect standard places a
higher burden on the firm. Implementing the profit-sacrifice test
requires similar information. The firm must know the value consumers
place on the product improvement in order to compare it to costs. That
is, the firm needs to know its quality-adjusted variable cost.200
In addition, the consumer welfare effect standard does not require
the firm to know what is impossible to foresee. The consumer welfare
effect standard only requires the firm to make a good-faith effort to
estimate the expected impact of its conduct on consumers. If the reasonably foreseeable expected value of the conduct to consumers is positive
but it turns out ex post that consumers are harmed, the defendant would
not be liable. Perfect foresight is not required.
The criticism of the information requirements of the consumer harm
standard also ignores the fact that this type of competitive effect analysis
is routinely applied in merger analysis. 201 The antitrust agencies, outside
attorneys, and economic consultants (and the courts in litigated cases)
evaluate the likely competitive outcomes of mergers arising from both
unilateral and coordinated effect theories, taking into account the potential for merger-specific cost savings, product improvements, and increases
in innovation efficiency, as well as the constraining impact of likely
200 For some other implementations of the profit-sacrifice test, the firm also might need
to know the profit-maximizing price and quantity increase in the hypothetical, but-for
world in which compatibility with competitors' products hypothetically were maintained,
so that the competitors remained viable. That price increase mayor may not be equal to
the $5 value of the product improvement; it would depend on additional details about
the demand curve. That is, the counterfactual, but-for world would need to be conceptualized, and the hypothetical revenue changes would need to be developed. Then, the
increased revenue must be compared to the increased costs of the improved product.
201 See generally Merger Guidelines, supra note 53.
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resposluoning, entry, and expansion by fringe firms. This evidence is
used to gauge the likely impact of the merger on prices and quality. If
a consumer welfare effect rule of reason analysis can be implemented for
mergers, there is no reason why it cannot be implemented for Section 2
exclusionary conduct cases.
In any event, it is not clear why a modest increase in the information
burden placed on the firm should determine the antitrust standard.
Instead, the proper test is the one that leads to the consumer welfare
maximizing outcome, taking those costs into account. In many other
areas, the legal system requires firms to bear information costs to ensure
that their conduct is consistent with the social interest. For example,
merging firms are required to bear the costs of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
(HSR) pre-merger review process to ensure that anticompetitive mergers
are not consummated. In product liability law, escaping liability for
design defects requires the manufacturer to know consumer expectations
and to compare the benefits of the challenged design against the risk of
danger inherent in such design. 202 That information is required because it
is needed to evaluate the impact of the product design on consumer
welfare. The consumer welfare effect test for Section 2 would have a
similar goal: to ensure that consumers are not harmed by exclusionary
conduct.
The resulting burden on firms and their legal counselors would be
modest at best. The fraction of firms that have monopoly power or
a significant likelihood of achieving monopoly power from allegedly
exclusionary conduct is small. Entry is easy in most markets and easy
entry would trump these allegations. Antitrust lawyers provide counseling
to firms regarding thousands of mergers per year, and the required
competitive analysis for mergers is not systematically more difficult than
the analysis required here.
Melamed also overlooks another important issue with respect to the
defendant's relative burdens under the two standards. Whereas the burden of production under the consumer welfare effect standard clearly
will lie with the plaintiff, the burden with respect to profit sacrifice could
well be allocated to the defendant. 203 This is because the information
202 See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co. 573 P.2d 443, 452 (Cal. 1978); see also Shanks v. Upjohn
Co., 835 P.2d 1189 (Cal. 1992); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734 (Haw.
1983). This risk/benefit analysis could be quite complicated and would include the likely
incidence of injuries from the use of its product, taking into account its likely sales
and the manner in which the product is used in practice, perhaps in conjunction with
other products.
203 Werden argues that the burden should and would be placed on the plaintiff. Werden,
supra note lO, at 426-27, 433 & n.97.
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required to determine whether or not there is profi t sacrifice is con trolled
by the defendant in that it primarily involves information regarding
the defendant's costs and demand. 204 In this regard, the Covad court
permitted the plaintiff to withstand a motion to dismiss simply because
the complaint included the magic word "predatory." 205 In contrast, under
a Section 2 consumer welfare effect standard, the plaintiff could only
shift the burden of production to the defendant if it could present
sufficient evidence to support the allegation that the defendant's conduct
resulted in injury to consumers and rivals.
VI. UNILATERAL REFUSAL TO DEAL BY A VERTICALLY
INTEGRATED MONOPOLIST
The Court in Trinko suggested the relevance of the profit-sacrifice
standard for unilateral refusals to deal. Applying this standard would
require the determination of price and output benchmarks. The output
benchmark might be controversial because there are two markets (or
market segments) involved in the analysis. For example, in Aspen Skiing,
by refusing to sell daily lift tickets to the plaintiff, Ski Co. likely increased
the retail sales of its own weekly tickets. Even if one were to assume (in
the hypothetical world according to the profit-sacrifice benchmark) that
this conduct would not allow Ski Co. to increase the price of its weekly
tickets, the additional weekly ticket sales at current prices might have made
the refusal to deal profitable. Thus, if the output benchmark for the
profit-sacrifice test does not hold the defendant's output constant at the
pre-conduct level, but permits its output to expand at the pre-exclusion
price, then Ski Co's exclusionary conduct might not have been found to
fail the profit-sacrifice test. It is not clear whether the Court purposely
chose to ignore this additional source of profits or whether the defendant
simply overlooked the argument. 206
204 A decision-theoretic analysis implies that it would make no sense to place the burden
on plaintiffs, who have inferior access to the relevant information. For example, in the
quick-look standard, the defendants have the burden ofjustirying concerted conduct that
would raise prices absent a showing of competitive benefits, such as cost savings flowing
from the concerted conduct. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 V.S. 85, 114 (1984); see also
Gavil, Dominant Firm Distribution, supra note 34, at 69-73. Of course, the defendant's control
over the information also might give the defendant an upper hand in the litigation by
allowing it better to shape the presentation of this information to the court.
205 As noted earlier, the Covad court stated, "But, Covad has alleged that Bell Atlantic's
refusal to deal was 'predatory,' which suffices to withstand a motion to dismiss because,
in the vernacular of antitrust law, a 'predatory' practice is one in which a firm sacrifices
short-term profits in order to drive out of the market or otherwise discipline a competitor."
Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl., 398 F.3d 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
206 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 V.S. 585, 599, 607-10
(1985). For example, suppose that the sale of the tickets to the plaintiff would have led
a fraction of the skiers to ski for two days on the plaintiff's mountain and one day on the
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In evaluating profit-sacrifice in Trinko, Verizon clearly wanted to count
the profits on its increased output of retail sales flowing from its refusal
to deal. Verizon argues in its brief that it "leases out those lines at an
average of $19.14 per line, giving up the average of $41.98 per line
revenue it obtains selling at full retail prices (and sacrificing the customer
relationship that might lead to sales of more services)."207 Verizon's
proposed methodology would count (as legitimate) the profits on the
additional retail customers absorbed as a result of the refusal to deal,208
It is not clear whether Verizon persuaded the Court and the DO] to
count these profits or whether the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that
the regulated price exceeded even Verizon's marginal costs. 209
If output levels are permitted to be adjusted in this way in cases of
unilateral refusals to deal by vertically integrated firms like Verizon, it also
would be necessary to estimate the cross-elasticity of demand between the
defendant and rival firms. For example, Verizon's calculation above
assumes that it would capture all of the rival's output. However, if the
products are differentiated and market demand is not perfectly inelastic
(i.e., if total market output is not constant), then this is assumption is
not economically correct. A better assumption is that the integrated firm
would capture only a fraction of the sales lost by the unintegrated rival.
In a monopoly maintenance case involving a unilateral refusal to deal
by a vertically integrated input market monopolist (or dominant firm),
the profit sacrifice test also requires a court to determine an input price
benchmark. 210 This same determination is required in price squeeze
cases, where courts must define the input price level that is unlawfully
exclusionary.211 If the firm supplies the input to non-competitors or
defendant's mountain, whereas the refusal to deal led those skiers to ski for three days
on the defendant's mountain. For a similar point, see Elhauge, supra note 34, at 286-87.
Professor Patterson suggests that the Court's language supports the view not to count this
source of profits as legitimate. Patterson, supra note 34, at 39. However, in rendering its
decision, the Court instead could have been relying on the fact that Ski Co. was willing
to sell those daily tickets to tour operators, and those sales would have led to the same
type of substitution to the competitor's mountain.
207 Brief for Petitioner at 27 n.23, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (No. 02-682).
208 In their amicus brief, Professors Baumol, Ordover, Warren-Boulton, and Willig suggest
that the proper measure of profitability for the sacrifice test would include the profits (at
competitive prices) on the customers shifted. Baumol et aI., supra note 151, at 15.
209 Brief for the United States, supra note 8; see also Melamed, UnifYing Principles, supra
note 11, at 392 n.49. Melamed was one ofVerizon's attorneys.
210 Of course, if supplying the input would be technologically infeasible, then the court
would not reach this pricing issue.
211 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1945)
(price is exclusionary if it is "higher than a 'fair price,'"); Town of Concord v. Boston
Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, J.) (criticizing the Alcoa standard).
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previously supplied the foreclosed competitor, then this input price
might be used. However, if the integrated finn has a legitimate input
monopoly and has never sold the input to anyone, there would be no
observable market input price to use. In addition, it may not be clear
whether the cause of the refusal to deal is the defendant's attempt to
maintain its output market monopoly or whether the cause is a simple
bargaining failure in the negotiations over the sale of the input. 212
One might suggest that the benchmark price for the input be the
price to which the parties would have bargained "absent any lessening
of competition." But this phrase does not create a meaningful price
benchmark, for every price above the input supplier's marginal cost
necessarily lessens competition by raising the rival's costs. Charging $6
for the input instead of $5 "lessens competition," even if the buyer could
successfully compete with the integrated monopolist if the price were
$50. At the other extreme, a prohibitively high input price is economically
equivalent to an absolute refusal to deal. Although this reasoning might
suggest a benchmark input price equal to marginal cost, a marginal cost
benchmark would not count input profits as "legitimate." This benchmark, in tum, would lead to the same objections as any price regulation
of a monopolist, including that it would interfere with the firm's incentives to innovate.213
See also Illinois Cities of Bethany v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 670 F.2d 187
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
212 This analysis also suggests an important distinction between non-negotiable refusals to
deal and situations where the vertically integrated defendant has made a bona fide offer
to supply the input at some price but the unintegrated firm has rejected its offer. (The term
non-negotiable refers to a refusal to deal regardless of the price offered by the competitor.)
Bargaining failure is a more likely cause if the parties each have made legitimate price
offers that the other has not accepted than if the refusal to deal is non-negotiable. Nonnegotiable refusals to deal raise greater suspicions that the primary motivation for the
refusal to deal is anticompetitive. Aspen involved a non-negotiable refusal to deal with
respect to the daily lift tickets and the revenue split for the weekly ticket. In the latter
situation, the defendant apparently disguised its unwillingness to negotiate by making an
offer that the plaintiff "could not accept." Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 592.
213 For the classic analysis of this issue, see Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet
in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST LJ. 841 (1989). This innovation defense
obviously must be limited. If the only concern were innovation incentives, then refusing
to deal would be per se legal. Indeed, any constraint on the dominant firm's conduct that
reduces its profits could, in principle, adversely impact its innovation incentives. There is
no reason to think that this extreme position makes economic sense, particularly because
it ignores the innovation incentives of the competitors and the welfare of consumers.
See F.M. Scherer, Technological Innovation and Monopolization 63 (American Antitrust Inst.
Working Paper 05-07, 2005), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/
431.pdf (analyzing the impact of judicial remedies on incentives for innovation, and
concluding that "[fJrom the great cases reviewed here, it would appear that dominant
firms have accumulated far more monopoly power than is necessary to motivate and
sustain the most rapid and beneficial rate of technological progress.").
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To implement the profit-sacrifice test (or the no economic sense variant), a better price benchmark would be the input price that compensates
the integrated firm for output sales lost to the input purchaser. 214 This
protected-profits benchmark input price would be calculated as the defendant's (variable) input cost plus the expected reduction in output profits
from selling a unit of the input to the plaintiff.215
In situations where the two firms produce and sell identical, fungible
products, this protected-profits benchmark input price equals the
Baumol-Willig Efficient Components Pricing Rule (ECPR) developed
in the regulatory context. 216 The ECPR price benchmark equals the
difference between the integrated firm's output price and its incremental
costs of producing the downsteam output (not including the cost of
the input). 217
When the two firms sell differentiated products, the benchmark price
would have to be adjusted to take into account the fact that not all of
the purchaser's sales would displace output sales of the integrated firm.21B
214 If the vertically integrated monopolist is more efficient in the downstream market
than the unintegrated firm, this price may not permit the purchaser to earn positive profits
to be viable. If selling the input to the purchaser would raise the defendant's own costs,
for example, because of the defendant's technology or because the defendant's reputation
would suffer, then the benchmark would be appropriately adjusted upwards to take these
additional costs into account.
215 This reduction in profits would be the defendant's profits from selling an additional
unit of the output (i.e., the output price less its input and output variable costs) times the
likely output sales lost by the defendant to the plaintiff for every unit of input sold to the
plaintiff. When the firms are selling products that are perfect substitutes, this displacement
ratio equals unity. When the products are not perfect substitutes, this displacement ratio
is less than unity. This profit reduction can be estimated from the type of cost and demand
information routinely used in merger analysis.
216 Robert D. Willig, The Theory of Network Access Pricing, in ISSUES IN PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION 109 (Harry M. Trebing ed., 1979); William]. Baumol, Some Subtle Issues in
Railroad Regulation, 10 INT'Lj. TRANSP. ECON. 341 (1983); William]. Baumol &]. Gregory
Sidak, The Pricing ofInputs Sold to Competitors, 11 YALE]. REG. 171 (1994) ;JanuszA. Ordover
& Robert D. Willig, Access and Bundling in High-Tech Markets, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION
AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 103 (Jeffrey
A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999).
217 For example, suppose that the integrated firm is initially selling its output at the
monopoly price of $100. Suppose that it is earning $50 per unit because its marginal cost
for producing the input is $10 and its other marginal costs (not including the cost of the
input) are $40, so that its output marginal cost equals $50 per unit (i.e., $10 + $40). If
the entrant sells a fungible product, so that every unit of input sold to the entrant entails
a one-unit loss in output sales by the integrated firm, then the protected-profits benchmark
price would be $60, where this $60 figure is comprised of the $10 input cost plus the $50
(i.e., $100 - $10 - $40) profit per unit on sales lost to the entrant.
218 Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation, 46].
INDUS. ECON. 115 (1998); Mark Armstrong, Chris Doyle &John Vickers, The Access Pricing
Problem: A Synthesis, 44]. INDUS. ECON. 131 (1996); William]. Baumol,Janusz A. Ordover
& Robert D. Willig, Parity Pricing and Its Critics: A Necessary Condition for Efficiency in the
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As a result, the protected-profits input price benchmark would be lower
than the standard ECPR calculated above. 219 This lower benchmark price
coupled with the product differentiation often would lead to more vigorous price competition in the output market, even if the purchaser has
equal or even somewhat higher costs than the integrated firm.

In order to avoid the Cellophane Fallacy, this benchmark price would
not be set to permit the integrated firm to maintain its monopoly profits
in the output market. 220 Instead, it only would compensate the defendant
for profits on those output sales directly lost to the competitor, not for
the reduced profits on the rest of its output caused by the price reductions
arising from the entry of the competitor. For the same reason, the ECPR
benchmark does not permit the integrated firm to charge a higher input
price to a more efficient competitor that sells a fungible product. 221
The consumer welfare effect standard also requires a price benchmark
for unilateral refusals to deal in order to avoid claims that all refusals
to deal are anticompetitive and to avoid the plaintiff gaining artificial
bargaining power. The court might utilize the input price previously
charged or the "protected-profits" input price benchmark for this purpose. 222 This means that the analysis of unilateral refusals to deal has
similarities in the two standards.
Provision of Bottleneck Services to Competitars, 14 YALE J. REG. 145, 154-55 (1997). These
authors sometimes refer to a modified ECPR. To avoid possible confusion, I am not using
that terminology.
219 For example, in the context of Trinko, ifVerizon would refuse to provide DSL inputs
to AT&T, some additional customers would buy retail broadband service from Verizon.
But some others would choose to obtain cable or wireless broadband service from other
providers or stay with their dial-up service. Extending the example in the previous note,
suppose that only half of the entrant's sales come at the expense of the integrated firm
and half come from firms producing other products. In this situation, the displacement
ratio would equal one-half. Thus, the protected-profits benchmark input price would be
$35, that is, the $10 input cost plus $25, where the $25 figure reflects the $50 (i.e.,
$100 - $10 - $40) per unit profits on lost output sales, discounted by one-half to take into
account the fact that the input sales lead to the integrated firm losing half as many output
sales to the new entrant.
220 The ECPR has been criticized in the regulatory context for falling victim to the
Celfgphane Fallacy by taking the output price as given at the monopoly level. See, e.g.,
Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient
Is the "Efficient Component Pricing Rule"? 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 557 (1995). Baumol and Willig
appear to agree with this criticism, but argue that the ECPR should be used after the
retail price is properly adjusted. Baumol et aI., supra note 151, at 155.
221 Similarly, when the products are differentiated, the protected-profits benchmark price
would not allow the integrated firm to extract the entire profit that could be earned by
the competing firm.
222 An alternative benchmark would be the input price that would be charged by a
hypothetical standalone (i.e., unintegrated) supplier with the same degree of legitimate
market power in the input market as the integrated firm. To ope rationalize this benchmark,
suppose hypothetically that the integrated firm is assumed to be divided up into two
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However, evidence of profi t sacrifice would not be sufficien t for liabili ty
under the consumer welfare standard. It also would be necessary to
explain how the refusal to deal would harm consumers; that is, it would
be necessary to show that sales to the competitor at the benchmark price
would lead to consumer benefits. This is not inevitable, particularly when
the integrated firm lacks market power in the output market. 223
Under certain other limited circumstances, a failure to show profit
sacrifice at the protected-profits input price benchmark might not be
fatal to the plaintiffs case under the consumer welfare standard. For
example, if the defendant's monopoly power in the input market was
not achieved legitimately, then no cognizable interest would be protected
by permitting the expansion (or maintenance) of monopoly power in
the downstream market through a refusal to supply the input. In this
case, there may be no need to support the level of investment incentives
provided by the protected-profits benchmark.
Similarly, consider the situation where the integrated firm has a natural
monopoly in the input and the firm is characterized as controlling an
"essential facility." If the market is not regulated by a specialized regulatory agency, a court may take on that regulatory burden under the
essential facilities doctrine. 224 In this case, however, the court also would
independent, unintegrated finns-a standalone input supplier and a standalone output
producer. (For example, this would be the type of structure following a hypothetical
"vertical divestiture" implemented against AT&T in the 1980s by the DOl under AAG
William Baxter.) This "standalone" input price benchmark would be the profit-maximizing
price that the standalone input supplier would charge the entrant. When the entrant is
selling a fungible product and has the same costs as the integrated finn, this benchmark
price equals the ECPR. When the products are differentiated, the benchmark changes
and does not equal the protected-profits benchmark. Moreover, calculating this benchmark
in practice would be significantly more difficult than the protected-profits benchmark,
making it less practical for courts.
223 For example, suppose that the only fertilizer dealer in an isolated fanning area is
also a fanner and refuses to sell fertilizer to the competing fanners in the area. Suppose
that the cost to these competing fanners of shipping in fertilizer from elsewhere is significantly more expensive and would lead these competitors to exit. That refusal to deal may
involve a sacrifice of profits by the integrated fanner and the conduct might not make
"economic sense" in the way that the tenn is used in the no economic sense standard.
But, if the relevant output market is national, then this refusal to deal likely would not
have any discemable impact on prices or anticompetitive effect on consumers. As a result
of this lack of market power in the output market, a court would not find the defendant
liable in this case under the consumer welfare effect standard. (In contrast, an inference
of consumer hann might make more sense if the integrated finn has monopoly power in
both markets.)
224 MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983). In
this regard, the Trinko Court said that its opinion did not "repudiate" the "'essential
facilities' doctrine crafted by some lower courts." Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 399 (2004). It suggested, however, that
the doctrine would be relevant only when access to the facility is not regulated. fd.
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have to determine the price benchmark that properly balances the shortterm benefits of price and entry competition in the output market along
with the appropriate investment incentives for the integrated firm and
its competitors. 225
VII. CONCLUSION
In the end, the benefits of the profit-sacrifice standard are overstated,
and the flaws are understated. It is said to be simpler to implement
than the consumer welfare effect standard, which is claimed to be very
complex. Yet, the profit-sacrifice standard is highly complex. For some
exclusionary conduct, there is no temporal profit sacrifice, so profit
sacrifice must be gauged conceptually with the use of a benchmark price
that must be constructed. Sometimes this benchmark price is the current
price, but sometimes it is not. Similarly, the output benchmark for the
profit-sacrifice standard mayor may not hold the defendant's output
constant, and whichever output benchmark is chosen will cause erroneous outcomes in certain cases.
For example, for monopoly maintenance cases, the profit-sacrifice test
would require the court to predict the price that would occur absent
the exclusionary conduct. But, if this price can be predicted confidently,
then the court would be able to use the consumer welfare effect test. If
the exclusionary conduct leads to a higher price or prevents the market
price from falling, then there is presumption of consumer harm. It would
make more sense for the court to evaluate whether the defendant's
product has improved sufficiently, as a result of the exclusionary conduct,
to outweigh the price increase.
The consumer harm standard is said to condemn beneficial competitive conduct, such as a cost-reducing investment that happens to cause
rivals to exit from the market (and ultimately leads to higher prices).
In fact, if the harmful effect on consumers is not reasonably foreseeable
in probabilistic terms at the time of the investment, there would be no
violation of the consumer effect standard. Only investments that are
harmful on the basis of an ex ante effect analysis would be condemned.
Nor would false positive errors be avoided by the profit-sacrifice standard.
Some cost-reducing investments that benefit consumers clearly would
be condemned under the profit-sacrifice standard.
225 In this analysis, the court could recognize the potential for adverse innovation effects
on the defendant, but might reason that a more interventionist antitrust policy would
increase total innovation by driving increased innovation by the new entrants. See Baker,
Promoting Innovation, supra note 24, at 514. In addition, if the entrant would be producing
a differentiated product, a refusal to deal could cause additional consumer harm.
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Although critics claim that the consumer harm standard is too complex
and errs in practice, the same basic standard is used routinely and
successfully in HSR merger reviews, Section 7 cases, and Section 1 rule
of reason cases. Making it the standard for Section 2 would unify antitrust
law and make the doctrine more coherent. The profit-sacrifice test may
be a useful piece of evidence in conjunction with other evidence, but
when it is the sole liability standard, or a required prong of the liability
standard, the profit-sacrifice test is likely to cause significant judicial
errors without adding any benefits. In that broader role, it does more
harm than good, relative to the consumer welfare effect standard.
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